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Abstract 
Acting in the world in a way that matches our goals, overriding impulses, is one of the 
first abilities that we must learn while growing up. We often change the course of our 
actions because of external influences or because we simply “change our mind”. As 
John H. Patterson said, “Only fools and dead men don't change their minds. Fools 
won’t. Dead men can’t”. An important distinction must first be made between the 
impact of internal and external sources on action decisions, and the first part of the 
introduction will be devoted to this topic. In the second part, I will discuss the topic of 
inhibitory control. In the scientific literature, action inhibition is often treated as a 
unitary phenomenon, while the distinction among different types of inhibitions might 
explain the diverse results and be useful for future studies. My experimental work has 
been devoted to both externally-triggered and internally-driven voluntary action 
inhibition, in particular, in Experiment 1 I conducted a set of studies aiming at 
understanding the underlying cortical circuits for internally-driven action inhibition, 
whereas Experiment 2 focused on proactive inhibition mechanisms. While it is beyond 
the scope of this manuscript to cover the entire literature on inhibitory control, I would 
like to propose a common view to unify the different theories concerning how the brain 
exerts voluntary inhibitory control and provide some suggestions for future 
investigations to study the way we flexibly control our actions to cope with the 
constantly changing external, and internal, environment.  
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1.1 Internally-driven and Externally-triggered actions 
As simple as drinking a glass of water may seem, many years of research on cognitive 
control, actions and decision making have not yet solved the issue of how even a simple 
act is implemented in the brain and which brain mechanisms make it happen. Even 
more intriguing is the study of how the brain interrupts a planned action, since in 
everyday life we must often stop a planned action due to changes in the environment. 
For instance, when a traffic light becomes red, we immediately must stop pressing the 
car accelerator; however, stopping an action can also result from an internal decision 
(Schüür & Haggard, 2011) when, for instance, one refrains from saying something 
inappropriate. Most of the time, a combination of internal and external factors drives 
our decisions to act or refrain from it. “Most people recognize the feeling of trying to 
get on with something they want to  do,  yet  being  constantly  distracted  by  other  
pressing  demands” (Astor-Jack  &  Haggard,  2005). This feeling, that everyone has 
experienced at least once in a lifetime, is likely caused by the constant balance we try to 
achieve between internally generated and externally triggered actions. I will first 
address the debate concerning the definition of these two types of actions, and, 
secondly, I will discuss whether it is possible to empirically address the hypotheses they 
raise. 
 
Self-generated actions and their empirical tractability 
In 1890, William James wrote the Principles of Psychology, in which he defined 
ideomotor actions (although Carpenter first coined the term in 1852), as actions that 
follow an “idea of a movement” whenever such “idea” is not inhibited by an 
antagonistic representation of another action. In particular, James stressed the concept 
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of competition among alternatives, which arises whenever multiple ideas, mental 
representations of possible acts, compete and inhibit each other. According to this view, 
an action can be performed when, in a  momentary lapse of consciousness,  the  subject  
forgets  about  the  antagonist  ideas,  thus  the main ideomotor action can take place. 
Frith and colleagues later reformulated the idea of James and they defined spontaneous, 
or self-generated actions that are not triggered by external stimuli but that are internally 
driven (Frith et al., 1991). The distinction between internally and externally guided 
actions is intuitively accessible to everyone, since it easily relates to our subjective 
experience. However, Nachev & Husain (2010) and Obhi (2012) claimed this 
dichotomy cannot be empirically studied, because the tasks commonly used to 
investigate voluntary actions should be by definition “free choice” and “conflict” tasks, 
inevitably confounde in an experimental setting. Moreover, the authors claim that, 
despite the best effort researchers can do to account for all the possible confounding 
variables, it is impossible to control for internal factors. This “internal world” is only 
accessible through subjects’ reports  (e.g. Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004; 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) and, there is no objective measure to test their 
reliability. 
Passingham and colleagues (2010b) proposed an alternative view and suggested that 
conclusions can still be drawn from studies addressing the internal/external locus of 
action decision, if one is willing to refute the idea that external components play no role 
in voluntary actions. More recently, Schüür and Haggard (2011) divided self-generated 
actions into two types: operant actions (type I) and undetermined actions (type II). Type 
I actions are triggered by identifiable and experimentally manipulated internal inputs 
(cues), such as memory traces, elapsed time intervals, previous actions or (a change in) 
behavioural goals. This definition does not rule out the presence of external factors, but 
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they are not determinant for the choice of which action to perform, when to perform it 
and/or whether to act at all. On the other hand, type II actions are performed in absence 
of an external input, therefore by defined self-performing agents (or “agentic self” as 
defined by the authors). There is, however, scientific evidence showing that our 
perception of agentiveness can be misleading (Wegner, 2003; Lau et al., 2007; Banks & 
Isham, 2009). Thus, undetermined actions are prone  to the previously exposed 
criticism, both because they  are  commonly  studied  using  “free  choice”  paradigms,  
in  which  all  cues  for  action  (external  and internal) are removed and, because our 
experience of self-generated actions is often incorrect. 
Finally, Schüür and Haggard (2011) added a third type of self-generated actions (type 
III), described as the motor output that derives from processing and integrating a large 
number of qualitatively different types of input that can be experimentally manipulated 
directly (e.g.  by controlling  food intake of an organism) or indirectly (e.g. salt craving  
caused by hunger) (Schüür and Haggard, 2012). In their view, the degree of self-
generatedness of an action depends  on  the  number  and  quality  of  inputs  (internal  
and  external), in order to make a decision to move. Type III actions are different from 
operant (type II) actions in that type III actions can be triggered, in part, by external 
inputs. Thus, by manipulating the number and types of inputs in a task, one can 
empirically investigate self-generated actions  
In this study, we investigate internally-driven actions, also termed voluntary, self-
generated or endogenous actions, whose characteristics are more similar to operant 
actions (type I), with some features of type III actions. In fact, although external inputs 
are present in the experiment, they are likely not to drive the decision to act or inhibit. 
This matter will be described in more details in the method section of experiment 1. 
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1.2 The study of internally-driven actions: methods and limitations 
The study of internally-driven actions allows us to investigate how we perform and 
implement our decisions to interact with the external world in a way that fits our goals. 
Setting our goals, deciding the best strategies to achieve them and performing the 
correct set of actions (while inhibiting irrelevant ones) is part of what makes us humans. 
Despite the importance of understanding how we generate internally-driven decisions, 
the number of studies addressing this issue is very scant. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that in a number of neurological pathologies internally-driven actions are 
impaired. For instance, the amplitude of the Bereitschaftspotential (BP), an electrical 
potential related to preparatory activity for self-generated movements, has been found to 
be reduced in Parkinson’s Disease (PD) patients (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). PD patients 
experience, among other symptoms, akinesia (also termed “paralysis of will”, Wilson 
1925), a significant reduction or loss of voluntary motor activity. Movement-related 
potentials are also impaired before the execution of self-initiated movements in patients 
with Schizophrenia (Fuller et al., 1999).  
A number of neurophysiological and imaging studies have investigated action selection 
processes and the timing of action execution, comparing “free selection” tasks with 
stimulus-driven conditions both in  non-human primates (Lee & Assad, 2003; Thaler et 
al., 1995) and in humans (Lau et al., 2004; Thut, Hauert, & Viviani, 2000). One of the 
most common paradigms used in the literature to compare the internally-driven to 
externally-triggered actions, is the ‘free selection paradigm’. Participants are asked to 
perform a right or a left button press, either following the instruction of an external 
stimulus (externally-driven action) or freely choosing one of the two, thus a ‘free 
selection’. Typically, participants can perform the button press any time within a 
specific interval; however, in this case, the decision of when to act is intertwined with 
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the action selection phase. This is a problem in many studies, where it is difficult to 
disambiguate between these two components.  For example, in an fMRI study, Lau and 
colleagues (2004) compared a free selection condition, with a “routine” task and a 
“specified” task. Participants were presented with a central cue, instructing them to 
either choose a target among a set of images (free selection), select the target 
highlighted by two white circles (routine task), or to select the image matching specific 
features of the cue (specified). The “routine” and “specified” tasks were examples of 
externally triggered actions with low and high attentional load respectively. The authors 
found a greater activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (interpreted as a 
conflict-monitoring brain site) and the pre-Supplementary Motor Area (pre-SMA) in the 
free selection condition, relative to the “routine” and “specified” conditions. However, 
in the free selection condition, not only participants could freely decide which button to 
press (with no particular reason to choose one over the other), but also when to press it, 
within 5 seconds interval. They were therefore instructed to move to the next trial (by 
moving a cursor) only after they had decided which target to move, whereas the action 
in the “specified” and in the “routine” conditions was expected immediately after the 
presentation of the cue. This confound was later addressed by Mueller and colleagues 
(2007) with an experimental paradigm that better distinguished between the what 
component (the selection of one action among a subset of possible alternatives), and the 
when component (the precise time of the action execution). Finally, this distinction has 
been later formulated and expanded in the “What, When, Whether model of  intentional 
action” – WWW model – (Brass & Haggard, 2008) that will be described in the next 
paragraph. 
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The ‘WWW’ model and its implication in action research 
In this model, Brass and Haggard distinguish between three main components of 
intentional actions: the what component, refers to the selection of one action among a 
subset of possible alternatives, the when component, which determines the precise time 
of the action execution and the whether decision to finally perform the planned action or 
refrain from it. This model has been very influential and it has changed the way in 
which intentional actions are investigated. An effort has been made to investigate the 
three components separately, when comparing internally-driven and externally-
generated actions. Particularly, the what and when components have been studied more 
extensively, while the whether component is more difficult to study for reasons that we 
will explain later. Here we will review some studies that investigated voluntary action 
selection and the timing of action execution.  
In an interesting fMRI study, Mueller and coworkers (2007) investigated the what 
aspect of voluntary actions, while controlling for the when component. Two stimuli 
were presented separated by 1200 ms and participants were asked to perform a left or 
right button press 600 ms after the presentation of the first stimulus. Critically, they 
used two conditions: the ‘externally-selected’ condition where the action selection (left 
or right button) had to be congruent with the location of the preceding stimulus, and the 
‘internally-selected’ condition, where the action choice would have determined the side 
of presentation of the upcoming stimulus. They found a greater activation of the Rostral 
Cingulate Zone (RCZ), a portion of the Cingulate Motor Areas, for the ‘internally-
selected’ condition. Unexpectedly, no pre-SMA activation difference was found 
between the two modes of action selection, as previously found by Lau and colleagues 
(2004), and, since the pre-SMA showed equal activity in both conditions, the authors 
suggested it might be involved in the timing or initiation of actions, present in both 
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conditions. In another fMRI study (Soon et al., 2008) the authors measured participants’ 
brain activity during a freely-paced motor decision task, in which subjects pressed one 
of two buttons when they felt the urge to do so, while watching letters presented on a 
screen. At the end of each trial, they had to report which letter was displayed when they 
decided on the motor action. The authors assessed, through statistical pattern 
recognition techniques, how much predictive information was contained in specific 
brain regions at various time points. The activity of the fronto-polar cortex (BA 10) and 
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex was highly predictive of the subsequent outcome 
of the free decision (action selection), at least seven seconds before the actual action 
took place. Conversely, activity in the SMA/pre-SMA complex was informative with 
respect to the timing of action execution, supporting the hypothesis of a role of these 
areas in the when component of voluntary actions. More recent evidence supports the 
idea of a common circuit responsible for action selection and onset timing of voluntary 
actions. fMRI results (Momennejad and Haynes, 2012) and direct extracellular 
recordings in patients undergoing surgery for pharmacologically intractable epilepsy  
(Fried  et  al.,  2011) revealed the involvement of the medial  frontal cortex,  including  
the SMA, in the what and when components of  internally-driven  actions.  Furthermore,  
Hoffstaedter  and colleagues (2012) reported a role of the anterior mid-cingulate cortex  
(aMCC) in both internal selection (what) and timing (when) of movements, but the 
activation was greater when these decisions were  not  triggered  by  external  stimuli.  
In  conclusion, recent scientific  evidence  supports  the  proposed distinction  between,  
at  least  partially,  separable  circuits  for  internally  and  externally  generated  actions. 
These results are in agreement with Goldberg’s (1985) view of a functional distinction 
between the fronto-median cortex, responsible for the intentional control of behavior 
and, the fronto-lateral cortex, more involved in the external control. This ‘two routes 
hypothesis of action’ includes the basal  ganglia  and  fronto-median areas, including  
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the  pre-supplementary  (pre-SMA) and  the supplementary motor area (SMA), and the 
cingulate motor area for internally-generated actions, while the circuit responsible for 
externally triggered  actions  includes  the  parietal  lobes,  lateral  premotor  areas  and  
the  cerebellum. Interestingly, Sherrington in his 1906 work “The integrative action of 
the nervous system” already supported the idea that both the premotor and the 
supplementary motor cortex project to the primary motor cortex which, in turn, provides 
a final common path to the muscles for movement (Astor-Jack & Haggard, 2005). The 
areas part of the internally-driven and externally-triggered action circuits have been 
updated over the years, but the concept of separate circuits remained valid. It is, 
however, less clear what are the circuits involved in action selection (what) and in the 
timing of the action (when). 
 
1.3 The Whether component and inhibitory control 
An important feature of cognitive control is the ability to withhold unwanted actions, in 
response to environmental or ‘internal’ changes. The term ‘intentional inhibition’ 
(Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012) refers to the voluntary inhibition of responses 
(internally-driven action inhibition). The ability to withhold or interrupt ongoing motor 
plans as a result of an internal decision is a distinctive feature of higher animal species 
(Curtis and D’Esposito, 2009), which is operationally defined in the whether component 
of intentional actions (Brass & Haggard, 2008). The study of inhibitory control is 
particularly relevant, since psychiatric and neuropsychological disorders often cause an 
impairment in the ability to inhibit compelling urges (addiction, Tourette syndrome, 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, obsessive/compulsive disorder and 
schizophrenia). Therefore, the study of the neuronal underpinnings of internally-driven 
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action inhibition can help us understand how the brain exerts control over response 
tendencies in the normal population as well as in brain disorders, with the final aim to 
find possible rehabilitative strategies. However, as anticipated above, the study of 
internally-driven action inhibition is more complex, compared to the study of the what 
and when components of intentional actions.  
To investigate the whether component, a study should compare an externally-driven 
condition in which the stimulus instructs participants to either execute the planned 
action or inhibit it, with an internally-driven condition where participants can freely 
decide whether to act or not. The study of the voluntary inhibition of actions is difficult 
because it is important to present participants with a stimulus that does not determine 
participants’ choice. Importantly, subjects should not choose in advance whether they 
will inhibit the planned action or not, however at target presentation, and when they 
choose to inhibit the action there is, by definition, no behavioral outcome to measure. 
Lastly, participants should have a reason to perform an action or not. Similarly, in real 
life, actions or action inhibitions have consequences and an experimental paradigm 
should provide participants with a motivated reason to either act, or inhibit the action, 
on each trial. Together, all these limitations have caused the voluntary inhibition of 
action to be almost unexplored by cognitive neuroscientists, whereas the study of the 
externally-triggered inhibition of action has received much attention over the years. The 
majority of these studies (Aron et al., 2004, 2007) use the Stop-Signal or 
countermanding task paradigm (Logan, 1994), where participants are required to plan a 
motor response on each trial (e.g. a button press) that they will perform upon the 
presentation of the target signal. Critically, on some trials, a stop-signal appears with a 
variable delay after the presentation of the target, instructing participants to withhold the 
response. Another paradigm often used to investigate action inhibition is the Go/NoGo 
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task, in which the target instructs participants to either execute the action or not. 
Moreover, by manipulating the probability of occurrence of the NoGo stimulus and the 
allotted time to respond (speed or accuracy task), participants are more or less likely to 
plan the action in advance (see Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011 for a critical comparison 
between the two paradigms). Several experimental studies (e.g. Obeso et al., 2013; 
Neubert et al., 2010) have suggested a role of the right Inferior Frontal Cortex (IFC) in 
the externally-triggered inhibition of actions, probably part of a circuit that includes the 
pre-SMA and the subthalamic nucleus (STN) (Aron et al., 2011), as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1 The brain network for reactive stopping. (A) Regions that are critical for stopping in 
the standard stop signal paradigm. Two regions within the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) are the 
inferior frontal junction (IFJ) and the posterior (p)IFG. The pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) is in the medial surface. (B) White matter tractography using diffusion tensor imaging 
reveals a three-way network in the right hemisphere between nodes that are critical for stopping 
action. (modified from Aron et al., 2011) 
 
 
Only few studies have used an experimental paradigm more appropriate to study 
internally-driven action inhibition (Brass & Haggard, 2007). In their fMRI study, Brass 
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and coworkers adopted a modified version of the Libet’s paradigm*, in which 
participants could freely decide whether to act or not, and later, they were asked to 
report the moment in which they thought the decision took place. In this task, like in 
Libet’s task, the time-locking event is the reported time of the decision-making process, 
but some studies on temporal binding have demonstrated how these subjective measures 
are systematically influenced by subsequent events (Banks & Isham, 2009; Herwig & 
Waszak, 2012; Moore & Obhi, 2012). Nevertheless, in this first attempt to investigate 
internally-driven action inhibition (which they call ‘endogenous inhibition of intentional 
actions’), the authors found a greater activation of the dorsal fronto-median cortex 
(dFMC, anterior to the pre-SMA and dorsal to the rostral cingulate zone) for the freely 
inhibited trials compared to action trials. The authors interpreted the role of the dFMC 
as “top-down control signal gating the neural pathways linking intention to action”, 
which is also supported by a positive correlation between individual dFMC activity on 
inhibitory trials and the frequency of inhibited actions. The authors further suggested 
that this area is likely not involved in the decision whether to act or inhibit, since this 
decision would be present in both action and inhibition trials, whereas they found very 
little activation of this area in action trials. 
 
 
 
 
*In Libet’s paradigm (Libet et al., 1983) participants watched a dot on the screen of an oscilloscope 
circulating like the hand of a clock. They were asked to perform a wrist movement at a time of their 
choice and later report the position of the moving dot when they were aware of the conscious decision to 
move.  
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Kuhn and coworkers devised a better experimental paradigm to study the distinction 
between a decision whether to act or inhibit (Kuhn et al., 2009): they compared, in the 
same subjects, a Go condition with a free-choice condition. In their fMRI study, the 
authors presented participants with a white marble on top of a tilted plane, the marble  
turned green on 50% of the trials (Go signal) instructing participants to press the button 
to stop it from falling off the plane. On the other half of the trials the marble would stay 
white, informing participants to freely decide whether to stop the marble (decide-Go 
trials) or inhibit the pre-planned action (decide-NoGo trials). In a first attempt to 
provide participants with a reason to either execute the action or withhold it, they used 
an aversive feedback (a glass breaking sound) whenever subjects decided not to inhibit 
the action (button press). By contrasting the two decide condition with a third control 
condition (externally instructed NoGo trials) they expected to find an area involved in 
the decision whether to act or not, an area active in both decide-Go and decide-NoGo 
trials. This contrast yielded the activation of the RCZ, previously associated with the 
what component. They also replicated Brass and Haggard’s results, finding a greater 
activation of the dFMC (BA 9) in decide-NoGo trials, relative to decide-Go trials, 
consistent with the view that dFMC is involved in the voluntary inhibition of actions. In 
support of this view, they also found a significant difference in the effective 
connectivity with pre-SMA, suggesting that the dFMC might directly influence motor 
preparation. 
After the WWW model of intentional action, researchers have been trying to isolate the 
areas involved in the three components, using different paradigms to study externally-
triggered action generation and inhibition. A summary of the areas involved in the three 
components of intentional actions is shown in Figure 2. 
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Fig 2. Upper panel, median view of the human cortex. Lower panel, schematic drawing of the 
frontal brain regions that have been consistently found to be involved in the when, what and 
whether components of intentional action. SMA= supplementary motor area; RCZ= rostral 
cingulate zone; dFMC= dorsal fronto-median cortex. (Brass & Haggard, 2008) 
 
Despite these studies have provide some useful information regarding the brain circuits 
involved in internally-driven action inhibition, much still needs to be done to fully 
understand whether the same or different brain circuits are involved in the two types of 
action inhibition and whether the dFMC is causally responsible for internally-driven 
action inhibition. When investigating inhibitory control, as already pointed out earlier, 
oftentimes different names are used to refer to the same concept, like endogenous, 
internally-driven, intentional or self-generated action inhibition. In the next paragraph 
we will critically review a recent paper (Ridderinkhof et al., 2014) in which the authors 
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provided some dimensions along which inhibition can be distinguished and 
systematically investigated. 
 
The study of the multifaceted inhibition of actions 
As Ridderinkhof and collaborators correctly pointed out, action inhibition is often 
treated as a unitary concept, however, even within the domain of externally-triggered 
actions, it is easy to intuitively capture the difference between having to stop pressing 
the car accelerator when the traffic light turns red or refraining from smoking cigarettes 
because the packages says “it causes cancer”. Also among internally-driven action 
inhibitions there are differences, for instance between avoiding asking inappropriate 
questions or stop eating a delicious slice of cake.  
Just like the ‘WWW’ model tried to disentangle between different components of 
voluntary action inhibition, within the whether component Ridderinkhof and colleagues 
distinguished four relevant dimensions according to which, in the authors’ view, 
inhibition can be categorized (Ridderinkhof et al., 2014). In the first dimension, the 
authors distinguish between intentional and reactive inhibition. These two types of 
inhibitions can be compared to internally-driven and externally-triggered inhibitions, 
and, since there is evidence suggesting that external cues activate inhibition 
automatically (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), Ridderinkhof and coworkers used the term 
‘reactive’ for the latter type. I will explain later why, in my opinion, the terms 
intentional and reactive might create some confusion. The second dimension regards 
the timing of the inhibition process, the moment in time in which the decision to inhibit 
is implemented. For externally-triggered actions, using the Stop Signal paradigm 
described earlier, researchers manipulate the time interval between the Go and stop 
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signal, called stop signal delay (SSD), to study the brain areas involved in action 
inhibition at different stages during action production. The third dimension 
differentiates between global and selective inhibition. Global inhibition refers to the 
interruption of all responses, performed when fast inhibition is needed. For instance, 
Majid et al., 2012 used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to show that reduced 
cortico-motor excitability of the leg could be find in tasks requiring fast inhibition of 
hand movements. However, when one action is selectively inhibited, while others are 
performed, a selective inhibition mechanism is employed. Finally, in their last 
dimension, Ridderinkhof and colleagues propose a distinction among different types of 
action to be inhibited. Some characteristics of the actions that modulate inhibition are 
the strength of stimulus-response association and the prepotency of the action (how 
much it has been preactivated). This last dimension can be, however, very difficult to 
measure in an experimental condition.  
As previously anticipated, I believe that the first dimension proposed by Ridderinkhof 
and colleagues is useful but the chosen terminology might be confusing. The reason for 
this is that another type of action inhibition, called proactive inhibition is often 
contrasted to reactive inhibition (see the dual mechanisms of control (DMC) theory 
Braver et al., 2007; 2012). Proactive inhibition can be described as “how a subject 
prepares to stop an upcoming response tendency” (Aron, 2011) and it has been shown to 
be context-dependent (Wardak et al., 2012). Reactive stopping (also sometimes called 
‘outright stopping’ e.g. Swann et al., 2012) is, instead, the ability to interrupt an action 
after the presentation of a target. While proactive inhibition probably depends on both 
internal and external factors, reactive inhibition, that is inhibition triggered (in time) by 
the presentation of a stimulus, is not necessarily externally-triggered. For example, 
while, in a Go-NoGo paradigm, the probability of presentation of a NoGo signal will 
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modulate the amount of proactive inhibition the subject will activate, and the target 
presented to participants can either instruct them to perform (Go signal) the action or 
inhibit it (NoGo signal) or just let them decide whether to act or not (decide Go/NoGo 
signal). For this reason it is reasonable to distinguish between proactive and reactive 
inhibition, the first is context-driven and the second is stimulus-triggered while the 
dimension regarding the level of intentionality proposed by Ridderinkhof and 
colleagues should instead be considered as a continuum from externally-triggered to 
internally-driven action inhibition (Filevich et al., 2012).  
In this experimental project, I focused on two types of action inhibition: in a first set of 
experiments I addressed the comparison between externally-triggered and internally-
driven actions. I specifically designed a task that asked participants on some trials to 
freely decide whether to perform the action or inhibit it, whereas on other trials the 
stimulus instructed participants to either perform the action (Go signal) or not (NoGo  
signal). In a second set of experiments I focused on proactive inhibition. In particular, I 
investigated the time course of proactive inhibition, hypothesized to be automatically 
activated after the presentation a warning signal. In particular I studied the mechanism 
that has been hypothesized to be responsible for the inhibition of automatic, early 
responses (Boulinguez, Ballanger, Granjon, & Benraiss, 2009; Criaud, Wardak, Ben 
Hamed, Ballanger, & Boulinguez, 2012). 
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2.1 Techniques employed in the experiments 
In this section the imaging techniques Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and 
electroencephalography (EEG) will be briefly introduced along with the rationale for 
using them in the present studies. Methods and procedures will then be discussed in 
details for each experiment below. 
 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
TMS is a tool used to stimulate the brain non-invasively. It uses of the principle of 
electromagnetic induction, discovered by Michael Faraday in 1831, which states that 
fluctuating magnetic fields can induce electric current in conductors placed nearby. 
With TMS, a magnetic field is generated by an electrical current generated inside the 
coil, as depicted in Figure 3. The magnetic field then induces an electrical current in the 
cortical surface underneath the portion of the scalp over which the coil is placed.  
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Figure 3 The figure illustrates the induction of electrical currents in the brain (black arrows in 
brain) through the magnetic pulses (red/pink) applied by means of the coil (grey 8-shaped 
figure) placed on the scalp. Adapted from Ridding and Rothwell (Ridding & Rothwell, 2007). 
 
Through the extracellular space, the induced electrical current excites the axons of the 
neuronal population in the surrounding brain tissue and, with sufficient intensity, it will 
cause the discharge of action potentials which will propagate to local (Allen et al., 2007; 
Mueller et al., 2014), and probably more distant networks (Ilmoniemi et al., 1997; Paus 
et al., 1997). The number and type of stimulated neurons will depend on their 
orientation relative to the current flow (Ni et al., 2011), and this will likely affect 
whether the effect of TMS on the ongoing brain activity will be excitatory or inhibitory 
(for a review see Kobayashi & Pascual-Leone, 2003). TMS is usually more focal when 
delivered with a figure-of-eight coil. The magnetic pulse reaches the brain unattenuated 
and it has been used by cognitive neuroscientists, since 1985 (Barker et al., 1985), to 
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non-invasively stimulate the brain. TMS can be used to map brain functions and explore 
the excitability of different regions, and more recently it has also been used as a 
rehabilitative tool for various pathological conditions (e.g. migraine, depression, 
schizophrenia, stroke). The effect of TMS on the stimulated tissue varies depending on 
the frequency and strength of the magnetic pulses, but it is also modulated by the 
distance between the coil and the brain (the intensity of the magnetic field decreases in 
proportionately to the distance squared), the amount of extracellular liquid surround the 
targeted brain area (e.g. presence of fissures and deepness of the sulci) and the 
orientation of the coil. These factors introduce some source of variability in the 
responses to TMS that should be taken into account when running an experiment. 
However, optically tracked frameless stereotaxic navigation systems are now widely 
used to guide the TMS coil, and should be used to reduce variability. TMS can be 
delivered either single-pulse, in pairs of stimuli separated by a variable interval, called 
paired-pulse TMS, or in trains, hence repetitive TMS. In my studies, I used repetitive 
and single pulse protocols.  
A single pulse of TMS delivers a magnetic field that can have an intensity of maximum 
2 Tesla and lasts about 100µs. When single pulse TMS is used to stimulate the hand 
area within the primary motor cortex (M1), with sufficient intensity (Rossini et al., 
1994), a brief, relatively synchronous muscle response can be measured with electrodes 
placed on the controlateral hand. The amplitude of this response, called motor evoked 
potential (MEP), is an indirect measure of cortico-spinal excitability, that is the 
susceptibility of motor areas to produce movements, due to the direct or transynaptic 
recruitment of cortico-spinal neurons (see Terao & Ugawa, 2002). The possibility to 
test, through single pulse TMS, the level of excitability of a cortical area has been later 
generalized to non motor brain regions. This technique can be used, in fact, to interfere 
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with cortical functions while participants perform a cognitive task and, due to its 
excellent temporal resolution (milliseconds), chronometric studies can be performed to 
determine the time course of the involvement of a specific brain region in a cognitive 
task. 
During repetitive TMS (rTMS), a train of pulses is delivered at the desired frequency 
and it produces effects that outlast the time of stimulation. When the pulses are 
delivered at low frequencies (0.2-1 Hz) the net effect on the stimulated brain areas is 
inhibitory (Walsh & Cowey, 2000). This was originally measured by applying low 
frequency rTMS to M1 and measuring the induced reduction in the amplitude of MEPs 
(Chen et al., 1997).  Low frequency magnetic stimulation is known to have inhibitory 
effects and can help test the functionality of a network system when the stimulated node 
is temporarily damped. This virtual lesion approach (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999) likely 
alters the entire system by either adding noise (Schwarzkopf et al., 2011), or by 
changing the synergies between regions that are part of the same network (Lee et al., 
2006; Plow et al., 2014) likely causing homeostatic changes in other brain areas, 
connected to the stimulated hotspot by cortico-cortical or cortico-subcortical 
connections (Siebner et al., 2004).  
 
Electroencephalography (EEG) 
EEG is a widely used, neuroimaging technique to record, almost in real time, the 
electrical brain activity. Electrodes are placed on the surface of the scalp to record the 
electrical activity of the neuronal populations. This technique is quite old, and it dates 
back to the German physiologist and psychiatrist Hans Berger (1873–1941) who 
recorded the first human EEG in 1924. EEG provides a unique way to non-invasively 
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record the oscillations of brain electric potentials, with great temporal resolution, 
although with low spatial resolution. EEG records a difference in potential (voltage), 
measured between two electrodes, an active and a reference electrode. Each electrode 
registers the summed activity of different neuronal populations, and one of the 
drawbacks of this technique is represented by the difficulty to isolate and localize the 
neuronal sources that generate the signals detected on the scalp. Despite these 
limitations, EEG provides useful information regarding the brain activity involved in a 
task and, specifically, the brain’s response to some events. By averaging many trials 
time-locked to some specific event of interest (e.g. target, motor response), it is possible 
to measure event-related potentials (ERPs), reducing the signal-to-noise ratio, which is 
another problem of EEG data. The voltage recorded on the surface of the head is, in 
fact, a sum of signal, which represents any type of brain activity the researcher is 
interested in, and noise, that is everything different than the signal. Only by averaging 
together the activity recorded from many trials, it possible to enhance, in the final 
recorded potential, the contribution of the signal and reduce the impact of the noise, 
assuming that the latter has a random distribution.  
By averaging the signal time-locked to some event, only phase-locked activity remains 
visible, but EEG also contains non phase-locked rhythmic activity, that reflects neuronal 
oscillations. These oscillations, fluctuations in the excitability of neuronal populations 
are described as frequency (speed of the oscillation, measured in Hz), power (squared 
amplitude, measured in µV) and phase (position along the sine wave at any given time 
point, measured in degrees or radians). The frequency bands typically analyzed in 
cognitive electrophysiology are the delta (2-4 Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-15Hz), beta 
(16-31) and gamma (32-150 Hz). Different cognitive processes and neuronal functions 
seem to make a greater use of some frequencies instead of others (Buzsáki & Draguhn, 
  
26 
 
2004). For instance, the alpha band has been related to inhibitory control (Hwang, 
Ghuman, Manoach, Jones, & Luna, 2014; Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007), 
whereas an increase in beta power has been associated, among other processes, to 
sensorimotor transmission (Kilavik, Zaepffel, Brovelli, MacKay, & Riehle, 2013). The 
relative power of some frequency bands changes in response to an input, or during a 
cognitive effort, and this difference is captured by event-related synchronizations 
(ERS), representing an increase in power, and desynchronizations (ERD), associated to 
a decrease in power. Many other types of analyses can be performed on EEG 
frequencies, and their description is beyond the scope of this paragraph (for a detailed 
description and discussion see Cohen M. X., 2014). 
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3.1 Experiment 1: Investigating internally-driven and externally-triggered 
actions 
As previously reported, not many studies have investigated, in the same subjects, the 
brain areas involved in internally-driven and externally-triggered actions and action 
inhibitions. The lack of studies investigating internally-driven action inhibition can be 
ascribed to the difficulty to design a task using a stimulus that does not directly cause 
the decision to act or inhibit, and to the lack of a measurable behavior, when the action 
is inhibited. Previous fMRI studies reported a greater activation of the rostral cingulated 
zone (RCZ) for both the endogenous what (Mueller et al., 2007; Lau et al., 2004) and 
whether decision (Kuhn et al., 2009). However, Kuhn and coworkers gave more 
compelling evidence through a connectivity study, showing that the dorsomedial frontal 
cortex (dFMC), also named ‘veto area’, might be responsible for the implementation of 
the internally-driven decision to inhibit an action. Other studies have found the right 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (rIFG) to be more involved in exogenous (externally-triggered) 
action inhibition (Chambers et al., 2006; Swann et al., 2012; Wessel et al., 2013).  
Here for the first time we investigated the causal role of the dFMC and the rIFG in the 
inhibition of unwanted responses, comparing, within the same participants, externally 
and internally-driven action inhibition using a psychophysical paradigm. We used 
inhibitory transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left dFMC and rIFG to 
study their role when subjects must freely decide whether to act or not. Results indicate 
a prevailing role of the dFMC in endogenous action inhibition. Electroencephalography 
(EEG) also showed distinct neuronal markers for exogenous and endogenous action 
inhibition. 
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3.2 Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Nineteen right-handed university students (mean age 24.7 years; SD 3.5; 10 females) 
with no neurological or psychiatric impairments voluntarily participated in the study. 
Handedness was determined via a condensed version of the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All subjects provided written informed consent, according 
to the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the 
ethical committee of the University of Trento. All participants passed the TMS and 
EEG safety screenings.  
 
Experimental procedure 
The study comprised a behavioural session that lasted approximately one hour, followed 
by three TMS-EEG sessions on three separate days. The overall duration of the 
experiment was about 10 hours. During each TMS-EEG session, EEG was employed to 
record brain activity of participants while they performed the Act or Inhibit task (see 
below for a detailed description), before and after applying TMS over one of three brain 
areas (see “TMS-EEG sessions” section), during an offline procedure. Throughout the 
duration of each session, subjects seated on a comfortable chair at a distance of 57 cm 
from the computer screen and responses were collected using a low-latency USB 
response box (DirectIN v2012, Emprisoft, Inc.). The task was presented on a 22” 
Samsung 2233RZ LCD monitor running at 120Hz on a Windows 7 machine running 
Matlab 7.2 and Psychotoolbox 2.0 experimentation presentation software. Participants 
were paid a fixed amount for the behavioral session and a variable amount for each of 
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the stimulation sessions, depending on their performance in the cognitive task. The 
order and duration of each experimental session is described in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 The figure shows the order and duration of each experimental session. During the first 
behavioural session subjects were tested on three tasks: the speed threshold, the colour threshold 
and one block of the Act or Inhibit task. This sequence was repeated three times for a total 
duration of about an hour. Each TMS-EEG session started with two blocks of the Act or Inhibit 
task (baseline), followed by 20 min TMS while subjects rested. Immediately at the end of the 
stimulation, subjects performed 3 blocks of the Act or Inhibit task (15 min). After 30 min of rest 
participants performed 1 more block of the Act or Inhibit task, for a total duration of about 3 
hours for each TMS-EEG session. Brain activity of participants was recorded during every 
TMS-EEG session.  
 
Behavioural session 
During the first behavioural session, participants performed three tasks, repeated three 
times each. Two tasks had a built-in staircase procedure to measure the psychophysical 
thresholds for the subsequent task that participants performed during the stimulation 
condition. In all three tasks, participants were presented with a marble at the top of a 
tilted plane. The plane consisted of a white line, 0.35 thick and 27.8 long degrees of 
visual angle, with a luminance of 204.5 cd/m², tilted at an angle of 30 degrees, running 
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from the upper left to the bottom right quadrant of the screen. The marble was always 
presented at the top of the plane, hence on the top-left side of the monitor. All stimuli 
were presented on a black background (0.2 cd/m²).  
During the Speed Threshold task, on each trial, participants were presented with a static 
white marble 3.55 degrees in diameter, and the task was self-paced. Subjects were asked 
to press a key on the response box with their left index finger to start the next trial. After 
a variable delay (between 0 and 3 seconds) the marble started rolling down the tilted 
plane at a fixed velocity. Participants were asked to wait for the ball to start moving and 
then press another key with their right index finger as quickly as possible to stop it. A 1-
up-1-down staircase procedure was employed to determine, for each participant, the 
threshold speed at which they were able to correctly stop the marble before falling off 
the plane on 50% of the trials. The task ended when the threshold speed was 
determined. 
In the Colour Threshold task, the marble started moving after a variable time interval 
(same as before), after participants pressed the key to start the trial. The speed was 
constant as individually measured during the previous task. We used a staircase 
procedure, this time to measure a shade of colour that was subjectively perceived as an 
ambiguous colour in between two predefined colours (that is when they reported 50% of 
the times one of the two colours, see below for a detailed explanation). The task stopped 
once the ambiguous colour was found. We intermixed six staircases: one staircase 
started from the colour green, one from the colour magenta and four others from mid 
points between these two colours. The two staircases starting from green and magenta 
had bigger step sizes than the others. Colours were defined in the Lab Colour Space, a 
color-opponent space with dimension L for lightness and a and b for the color-opponent 
dimensions, which allowed us to modify the green/red values while keeping lightness 
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and yellow/blue values constant. On each trial, the marble was a different shade of 
colour between green and magenta and participants were asked to watch the marble 
rolling down the tilted plane. At the end of each trial, the word “magenta” was 
presented on the left side of the screen and the word “green” was displayed on the right 
side. Subjects were asked to press one of two keys on the response box indicating 
whether the marble looked “more magenta” or “more green”. The colour-related words 
presented on the screen were spatially congruent with the keys to help subjects 
remember the location of the key they meant to press. After the response, a new trial 
started with a new coloured marble.  Once the ambiguous colour was determined, 14 
other shades of colours were mathematically determined, so that 7 would be closer to 
magenta and 7 to green. A cumulative of normal distribution was generated with mean 
corresponding to the threshold value of the staircase (ambiguous colour) and standard 
deviation (std) of the staircase. Being the extremes of the distribution green (0) and 
magenta (1), two out of the seven shades of colour were randomly sampled within 1 std, 
for each side of the distribution. The remaining 5 shades of green were randomly 
sampled in the range from mean-1std. to the 20th percentile, whereas the 5 shades of 
magenta were randomly sampled in the range from mean+1std. to the 80th percentile.  
In the third task, named Act or Inhibit task, we used a modified version of the task 
employed by Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn et al., 2009). On each trial, a marble was 
presented on the top of a tilted plane and after a variable interval (Stimulus Onset 
Asynchrony: 150, 300, 500, 1200, 1500, 3000 ms) it started rolling down the plane at 
the threshold speed determined during the first task. On each trial, the ball could have 
been one of the predetermined 15 shades of colour. Colour presentation and SOAs were 
pseudo-randomly intermixed across trials. Participants were asked to wait for the ball to 
start moving and then to press a key with their right index finger “only if the colour of 
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the marble looked more green”. Each block consisted of 120 trials: the ambiguous 
colour was used in half the trials, 30 trials were green trials, randomized across the 7 
shades of green, and 30 were magenta, randomized across the 7 shades of magenta. 
Since participants were asked to perform a single button press in order to stop the 
marble only if its colour was perceived as being green, the green and magenta marbles 
are examples of “Exogenous Go” and “Exogenous NoGo” stimuli, respectively. 
Importantly, the ambiguous colour by definition was not easy to categorize, forcing 
subjects to behave randomly and, for this reason, we consider this an “Endogenous 
Go/NoGo ” condition, since it allows participants to freely decide whether to respond or 
not. On Endogenous Go/NoGo trials, participants pressed the button 50% of the times (a 
t-test was used to confirm that the relative frequency of responses was not significantly 
different from chance), suggesting that the staircase procedure worked properly. We 
computed multiple shades of green and magenta to prevent participants from 
memorizing the colours and the correct stimulus-response pairing. In fact, since some 
shades of magenta and green looked similar to the ambiguous colour (within 1 std from 
threshold value), participants most likely were not aware that one specific shade of 
colour was presented more frequently. Furthermore, at the end of each trial, after a 300 
ms interval (during which late responses were recorded), a feedback was presented for 
1500 ms at the location where the next marble would appear. One of two feedbacks 
were provided: when the key was pressed before the marble fell off the plane the text 
“Blocked” appeared, whereas “Not Blocked” was displayed in case of a late response or 
a no key press. Additionally, if the marble was green and participants correctly pressed 
the button, the text “Good + 10c.” was shown. Rewards were given for quick responses 
only, to keep participants motivated to always prepare a response and, if necessary, to 
inhibit it. Similarly, on Exogenous NoGo trials (magenta) the same feedback appeared 
if participants decided not to press the button. In case of mistake (late or no response on 
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green trials/key press on magenta trials) the text “No. 0c.” was presented. Critically, on 
ambiguous colour trials (Endogenous Go/NoGo), irrespectively of participants’ choice, 
one of the two feedback was randomly presented (either “Good. +10c.” or “No. 0c.” 
together with “Blocked” or “Not blocked”, respectively, depending on their choice). 
Participants were informed that they would be paid the amount of money they 
accumulated during this third task (except for the first behavioural session), however 
during the study they were unaware of the feedback manipulation (they were fully 
informed at the end). Subjects were also informed that due to the difficulty of the task 
and speed of the marble, they would probably not earn money on every trial. Since 
participants were rewarded (and paid) depending on their performance, they were 
motivated to perform a fresh decision on each trial and also to respond quickly. To 
avoid contamination of ocular movements at cue presentation and to have a variable 
inter-trial interval (ITI) in the last ten subjects, after the presentation of the feedback, a 
black screen was presented for a variable interval between 500 and 1500 ms, followed 
by a fixation cross at the location where the next marble would appear for a variable 
duration between 500 and 1500 ms, both in the Act or Inhibit task and the Colour 
Threshold task. In Figure 5 an example of exogenous Go trials is shown. Participants 
performed the two psychophysical tasks and one block of the Act or Inhibit task three 
times to obtain a stable performance and to familiarize with the Act or Inhibit task that 
was subsequently used for the TMS-EEG sessions.  
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Figure 5 The trial structure is shown, using the exogenous Go condition as an example (for 
showing purposes colours are inverted, the background is black and the is white). The arrows at 
the bottom represent time intervals. In this example, a button press was performed while the 
marble was rolling down the tilted plane at the threshold speed. A black screen was presented 
subsequently for 300 ms, during which late responses are detected. On each trial, the marble 
was coloured in one of the 15 possible shades of colours. 
 
 TMS-EEG sessions 
During each TMS-EEG session, participants wore an EEG cap where the electrodes 
were positioned. We first used TMS to measure subjects’ resting motor threshold 
(rMT), defined as the lowest TMS intensity necessary to elicit visible twitches of the 
right index finger on five out of ten consecutive trials. A repeated measure ANOVA 
was used to verify that the rMT did not significantly vary across days (p=0.3). For the 
last 9 subjects, we measured the rMT again at the end of the experimental session, to 
check for changes in cortico-motor excitability due to the TMS stimulation, and we 
found no significant differences for the three cortical sites we stimulated: dFMC (t(8)=-
0.299, p=0.773), rIFG (t(8)=-0.750, p=0.475) and V1 (t(8)=-0.832, p=0.429). 
Subsequently, participants performed two blocks (120 trials each) of the Act or Inhibit 
task at baseline. They then rested while we applied a 20-min train of repetitive low-
frequency (1 Hz) stimulation. Right after the end of the stimulation, participants 
performed the Act or Inhibit task for 15 minutes (three blocks), after which they rested 
for half an hour before executing another block to check for long-lasting effects. For a 
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subset of 10 subjects, we did a final block of Act or Inhibit task at 80 minutes after the 
end of the stimulation.  
TMS pulses were delivered using a 70 mm figure-8-coil connected to a Magstim Rapid2 
(Magstim Co., UK) and the stimulation intensity was set to 110% of their rMT. On each 
day of stimulation session, TMS was delivered over one of three hotspots determined 
using MRI-based neuronavigation (Brainsight, Rogue Inc), and the hotspots averaged 
across subjects are shown in Figure 6. We used the brain coordinates for the left dFMC 
(Brodmann Areas 9) from Kuhn et al. (2009) and for the rIFG from Aron et al. (2007) to 
guide our individually determined hotspots. Mean x, y, z MNI coordinates were -7, 42, 
21 and 57, 18, 6 for the left dFMC and rIFG respectively (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001). 
The control early visual area V1 was also determined using the stereotactic system 
(mean x, y, z coordinates: -17, -104, -5). The order of stimulation was counterbalanced 
across participants.  
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Figure 6 Upper part, The average stimulated areas are shown. From left to right: left dFMC, 
rIFG, left V1. Due to radiological conventions left is shown on the right side and viceversa. 
Lower part, on the left side the sagittal view of the left dFMC of one participants is displayed, 
whereas on the right side the rIFG from one subject is shown on the surface of reconstructed 3D 
brain. Data shown with permission. 
 
Continuous EEG was recorded from 27 Ag/AgCl surface ring electrodes (Fp1, Fp2, F7, 
F3, Fz, F4, F8, Fc5, Fc1, Fc2, Fc6, T3, C3, Cz, C4, T4, Cp5, Cp1, Cp2, Cp6, T5, P3, Pz, 
P4, T6, O1, and O2) mounted on a TMS-compatible elastic cap, according to the 
extended 10-20 international system. The ground electrode was placed between the 
electrodes Cz and Pz, and since the embedded reference electrode was the right mastoid, 
the average activity of all the electrodes was used as a reference instead, in order to 
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avoid lateralization effects. Eye movement EOG were recorded with two electrodes 
placed above and below the right eye. The layout is shown in Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7 The figure shows the configuration of the electrodes mounted on the TMS-compatible 
EEG cap. EMG1 and EMG2 electrodes were not used.  
 
The EEG was amplified and recorded with a full-band DC-EEG system (neuroConn 
GmbH, Llmenau, Germany) with a sampling rate of 2048 Hz. An indirect measure of 
impedance was calculated as a function of DC-offset which was set at less than 8µV 
with a standard deviation of less than 5µV over a 25 second period. A high pass filter 
with a frequency cut off of 0.001 Hz was applied, as well as a notch filter (band-stop 50 
Hz). Continuous data were visually inspected and noisy portions of the continuous 
recording were removed before applying Independent Component Analysis (ICA) (Bell 
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& Sejnowski, 1995). Independent components related to blinks, saccades and muscle 
artefacts were visually detected and removed.  
 
Behavioural analysis 
On the Act or Inhibit task, we recorded whether a button press was performed in the 
allotted time, and whether a late or no response was given. We excluded the trials where 
participants pressed the button during the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), before the 
ball started to roll down the plane. Response times (RTs) shorter than 100 ms were also 
excluded. We used a repeated measure ANOVA to test TMS-induced effects on the RTs 
with Bonferroni post-hoc correction, including both on-time and late responses. The 
number of given button presses was recorded separately for the three conditions 
(Exogenous Go, Exogenous NoGo  and Endogenous Go/NoGo ) and an analysis on the 
relative frequencies of the given responses before and after each TMS stimulation 
condition was conducted using the nonparametric Friedman test, with Wilcoxon post-
hoc analysis. Since we compared relative frequencies among conditions, the normality 
assumption of the ANOVA could not be tested, therefore a nonparametric test was used 
instead.  
 
EEG data analysis 
The software EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) (http://sccn.ucsd.edu/eeglab/) was 
used for the preprocessing and the ERP analysys of the EEG data. One subject was 
excluded due to excessive noise and the analysis was conducted on the remaining 18 
subjects. For the statistical analyses of the ERPs a repeated measure ANOVA with 
Bonferroni correction was used to compare the mean peak to peak amplitude of single 
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trials ERPs for each subject separately. Fieldtrip and ad hoc Matlab scripts were instead 
employed for the analysis of the frequencies. Spectral density estimation was performed 
using multi-taper method based on discrete prolate spheroidal (slepian) sequences 
(Percival and Walden, 1993; Mitra and Pesaran, 1999). We performed time-frequency 
analyses of the EEG time series for all sensors over a frequency band ranging from 6 to 
42 Hz (in steps of 1 Hz) using 3 orthogonal tapers 0.5s in duration and 8 Hz of 
frequency resolution, each stepped every 0.02s. Cluster-based permutation tests, using 
the Monte Carlo method, were then performed on time-frequency data at the group level 
(Maris et al., 2007). Subsequently, a 3-way ANOVA was conducted to test at the single 
subject level the effects found in the cluster-based analysis, using the false discovery 
rate (FDR) method (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) to account for the multiple 
comparisons problem. 
 
3.3 Results 
EEG results 
Brain activity of participants was recorded before and after the rTMS session, while 
they were performing the Act or Inhibit task. The pre-TMS recordings of each day of 
stimulation served to analyze the differences across task conditions: Exogenous-Go, 
Exogenous-NoGo , Endogenous-Go and Endogenous-NoGo . The last two conditions 
were created separating, in the Endogenous Go/NoGo condition, the trials in which 
participants voluntarily decided to press the button (Endogenous-Go) from the trials in 
which subjects decided to inhibit the planned action (Endogenous-NoGo). Since in this 
condition participants pressed the button half of the times at baseline, each of the four 
conditions has roughly the same number of trials.  
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In the ERP analysis, we included all the pre-TMS recordings from the three days of 
stimulation for a total of 180 trials per condition. We tested whether the elicited brain 
activity was significantly different between the endogenous and exogenous condition by 
comparing the stimulus-locked ERPs recorded before the TMS stimulation across the 
four task conditions. Stimulus-locked epochs were computed using the presentation of 
the static ball (cue) as time-locking event and extended from -1000 ms to +4500 ms 
(baseline period between -150 ms and +50 ms). For the current analysis, trials with an 
SOA shorter than 500 ms were excluded, thus all trials within each condition were 
identical until 1200ms post-stimulus. During this timeframe, participants looked at the 
coloured marble and decided whether to press the button or not, while waiting for it to 
start moving. Stimulus-locked epochs were averaged across each condition for each 
subject. We focused our analysis on the temporal windows of the N200 and P300 
components associated with response inhibition (Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; 
Ocklenburg, Gunturkun, & Beste, 2011). We computed the spectral maps of the grand 
averages for each of the four conditions from 250 to 550 ms post-stimulus and found a 
peak of negative activity during these timeframes on channels Cz, Fz, Fc1 and Fc2 in all 
conditions. The mean amplitude of the evoked potentials for each electrode, condition 
and subject was measured in three temporal windows, each 100 ms long. A 3-way 
ANOVA with factors channel (Fz, Cz, Fc1 and Fc2), time (250-350, 350-450, 450-550) 
and condition (Endogenous-Go, Endogenous-NoGo , Exogenous Go and Exogenous 
NoGo ) was computed, applying Bonferroni correction. Results show a significant 
effect of time (F(2,16)= 11.828, p=0.001) and condition (F(3,15)= 13.185, p=0.000), 
whereas no difference across the channels was found. Moreover, the channel*time 
interaction (F(6,12)= 7.373, p=0.002) and time*condition (F(6,12)= 11.596, p=0.000) 
interactions were significant, while the channel by condition interaction did not reach 
significance. Since there was no main difference across channels, the mean amplitudes 
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of the three electrodes were averaged together, separately for each condition and for 
each subject. We, therefore, created a unique measure of the intensity of the ongoing 
activity over fronto-central areas for each of the four conditions. We performed a one 
way repeated measure ANOVA and results showed significant differences across 
conditions starting from 350 ms post-stimulus (F=15,056, p=0.000 for the temporal 
window between 350-450 ms post-stimulus and F=24,154, p=0.000 between 450-550 
ms post-stimulus). In the 350-450 temporal window, a Fisher’s LSD post-hoc test 
showed significant differences between the Exogenous-NoGo  and all other conditions, 
of particular interest the comparison with the Endogenous-NoGo  condition (p=0.001). 
We found a similar result in the temporal window 450-550 ms after stimulus 
presentation (p=0.000), and a significant difference between the two Endogenous 
conditions (p=0.002), whereas the mean amplitude of the selected electrodes between 
the two Go conditions did not show any significant difference for any temporal window 
(p=0.592 and p=0.515, for 350-450 and 450-550 intervals respectively). Data are 
depicted in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8 This figure shows the stimulus-locked ERPs from the four conditions, as recorded 
before the TMS stimulation. Time zero represents the time at which the marble is presented on 
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top of the tilted plane and participants are waiting for it to start moving. Time (ms) is shown on 
the X-axis, while the Y-axis represents the amplitude (in µV) of brain activity averaged from 
electrodes Cz, Fc1, Fc2 and Fz (positive is up). A low-pass filter with cut-off 35Hz was applied. 
The black line indicates the temporal window in which significant differences were found (350-
550 ms).  The asterisk signals a p<0.05.  At the top right a spectral map shows the distribution 
of the electrical activity on the scalp at 350 ms post-stimulus with positive and negative voltages 
represented in red and blue, respectively.  
 
To test whether TMS modified the amplitudes of the ERPs, the average amplitudes of 
the four electrodes were included in two 2-way ANOVAs, for the time intervals 350-
440 and 440-550 ms, with factors task condition (Endogenous-Go, Endogenous-NoGo , 
Exogenous Go and Exogenous NoGo ) and stimulation (preTMS, dFMC, IFG and V1). 
Bonferroni post-hoc correction was applied. In both cases, the effect found on pre-TMS 
data was replicated, with a significant effect of the task condition (F(3,51)= 29.699, 
p=0.000 for the 350-440 ms interval and F(3,51)= 42.482, p=0.000 for the 440-550 ms 
temporal window), while we found no effect of stimulation. In response-locked ERPs 
(where time 0 is the button press) we compared the evoked activity between 
Endogenous and Exogenous Go trials, but no significant differences were found.  
For the time-frequency decomposition cue-locked epochs were taken from -1500 to 
2000 ms, with a baseline period ranging from -500 to -100 ms. Because for the time-
frequency analysis the baseline period has a greater impact on the estimated power, only 
the last 10 subjects were included in this analysis, since they were presented with 
variable ITIs. Cluster-based permutation tests (500 permutations) were then performed 
on the grand-averages to check for differences across task conditions, by applying 
paired samples t-tests. Again, trials with SOA shorter than 500 ms were excluded from 
the analysis. The comparison between Go and NoGo conditions revealed several 
significant clusters in fronto-central electrodes for both the internally-driven and the 
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externally-triggered condition. In Figure 9 electrode C3 is shown with significant 
clusters (p<0.05) for the Go-NoGo difference in the Endogenous (left) and Exogenous 
condition (right). A greater power of the slow delta frequencies is present in the Go 
conditions, with respect to the NoGo conditions along with a greater negativity in the 
alpha and beta bands, ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 seconds post-cue. 
 
 
Figure 9 The difference between the time–frequency representations (TFRs) of Go and NoGo 
trials, masked by the spectral–temporal pattern of the significant cluster. Endogenous and 
Exogenous trials are shown on the left and right panel, respectively. Red denotes a positive and 
blue denotes a negative raw effect. The TFRs are shown for the frequency range [6 Hz, 42 Hz] 
and the time interval [-1.5 s, 2 s]. 
  
The difference between the internally-driven and externally-triggered Go condition was 
significant, as displayed in Figure 10. Several electrodes show positivity in the alpha 
and lower beta bands, but interestingly no effect is found for electrode C3, indicating 
that the two conditions did not differ at the level of motor execution. Electrode Cp5 is 
shown as an example (Figure 10) where a relative increase in the alpha power is visible 
between 0.6 and 1.2 seconds after cue presentation. 
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Figure 10 Difference between the time–frequency representations (TFRs) of Endogenous Go 
and Exogenous Go trials, masked by the spectral–temporal pattern of the significant cluster. On 
the left side, all the electrodes are shows, with red blobs representing significant clusters. On the 
right side, electrode Cp5 is displayed. Red denotes a positive and blue denotes a negative raw 
effect. The TFRs are shown for the frequency range [6 Hz, 42 Hz] and the time interval [-1.5 s, 
2 s]. 
 
Results indicated that the time-frequency representations of the two NoGo conditions 
were not significantly different. To test whether these group effects were present at the 
single subject level, and moreover if they were modulated by the TMS, the time-
frequency representations (TFRs) of each subject were Z-scored with respect to the time 
interval -0.5 -0.1 s. We then conducted a 3-way ANOVA with factors level of 
intentionality (internally-driven vs. externally-triggered), type of trial (Go vs. NoGo) 
and stimulation (preTMS, dFMC, IFG and V1), for the alpha and beta frequency bands. 
We focused our analysis on the temporal window between -0.5 to 1 s relative to cue 
presentation, since the whether decision is likely to happen within the first 600 ms from 
cue presentation, although effects on the frequency power might be visible a few 
hundred milliseconds later. The alpha band failed to show significant results, whereas a 
significant effect of the type of trial was found in the beta band, particularly for 
electrodes C3 and Cp5. In Figure 11, the difference between Go and NoGo TFRs is 
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shown, using electrode C3 from the exogenous condition as an example, however the 
same difference is also present for the Endogenous condition. No other effects were 
significant. 
 
Figure 11 Grand-averages of the cue-locked TFRs for the Exogenous Go (left panel) and NoGo 
(right panel) conditions are displayed. On the x axis time is represented (from -0.5 to 1 second), 
whereas frequencies are shown on the y axis. The area surrounded by the dashed line on the 
right panel shows the time points and the frequencies showing a difference in power between 
the two conditions (p<0.05 after accounting for the false discovery rate). Red and blue colours 
represent a relative increase (ERS) and decrease (ERD) in power, respectively. 
 
Behavioral effect of TMS 
Low frequency rTMS should temporary inhibits activity of the stimulated brain areas 
and provides a direct mean to test whether the dFMC and rIFG are necessary to inhibit 
planned actions. To determine whether rTMS modified participants’ ability to inhibit 
the urge to press the button, and therefore to interrupt the planned action, we measured 
the ratio between the frequency of button presses participants performed before and 
after rTMS for the three task conditions (Exogenous-Go, Exogenous-NoGo  and 
Endogenous-Go/NoGo ), relative to the total number of trials per condition. If, in fact, 
the dFMC and rIFG are causally involved in action inhibition, whether endogenous or 
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exogenous, we should expect participants to be less able to inhibit action plans after 
stimulation, hence performing more button presses relative to baseline. An additional 
analysis was conducted on response times (RTs) to check for difficulty differences 
across conditions and TMS-induced modulation of impulsivity that could explain the 
behavioral results.  
 
Frequency of response 
We first measured the number of button presses participants performed when the 
ambiguous color was presented (Endogenous Go/NoGo  condition) and divided this 
number by the total number of trials. We hypothesized that the dFMC would be causally 
involved in the endogenous inhibition of actions, therefore the inhibition of the activity 
of this area through TMS could have temporarily disrupted and reduced the ability of 
participants to prevent the execution of a prepotent action plan, when they could 
voluntarily decide whether to perform the action or not. For this reason, we expected an 
increase in the number of given button presses in the Endogenous-Go/NoGo condition 
only. Since the role of the rIFG in the endogenous inhibition of action has never been 
directly investigated, we had no clear prediction for the outcome of the stimulation. To 
measure the after-effect of the TMS, for each rTMS session we normalized the 
frequency of the button presses executed in the testing phase after stimulation relative to 
baseline. A Friedman test was employed to check whether the six post-TMS blocks (2 
blocks for each day of stimulation: immediately and 50 minutes post rTMS) were 
significantly different relative to baseline. Results showed a significant effect (p=0.000, 
df=6) of TMS on the relative frequencies of button presses. To further explore which 
TMS stimulation(s) was yielding the difference, we used the Wilcoxon pairwise 
comparisons between baseline and post-TMS blocks, across the three stimulation sites 
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(dFMC, rIFG and V1). Only performance after stimulation of the dFMC was 
significantly different from baseline (Z=-2.575, p=0.01) clearly indicating a significant 
increase in the number of button presses during the Endogenous condition only, as 
shown in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12 Response frequencies after rTMS during the Endogenous Go/NoGo condition. 
Normalized frequencies of button presses after rTMS over dFMC (red bar), rIFG (green bar), 
and V1 (blue bar). Positive numbers represents an increase in the number of given button 
presses, relative to baseline (0 on Y-axis), whereas negative numbers indicate a reduction in the 
number of button presses. Error bars represent the standard error. Significant effects (p<0.05) 
are indicated by an asterisk.  
 
To check whether this effect was specific for the Endogenous condition, the same 
analysis was carried out on the Exogenous trials and, interestingly, no significant effects 
were found for either the Exogenous-Go (p=0.236) nor the Exogenous-NoGo trials 
(p=0.440). Results are shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13 Response frequencies after rTMS during the Exogenous Go (left) and NoGo  (right) 
conditions. Normalized frequencies of button presses after rTMS over dFMC (red bar), rIFG 
(green bar), and V1 (blue bar). Positive numbers represents an increase in the number of given 
button presses, relative to baseline (0 on Y-axis), whereas negative numbers indicate a reduction 
in the number of button presses. Error bars represent the standard error. Significant effects 
(p<0.05) are indicated by an asterisk.  On the left side results from Exogenous-Go (green) trials 
are presented, on the right side data from Exogenous-NoGo  trials are depicted  . 
 
Time Course of the Effect 
To check for long lasting effects, we subsequently tested for the duration of the post 
rTMS effect by comparing baseline performance with the blocks recorded 50 minutes 
after the end of the stimulation and, surprisingly, we found significant differences for 
both the dFMC stimulation (Z=-3.179, p=0.001) and the rIFG (Z=-2.374,p=0.018). No 
significant differences were found for the control stimulation condition. Data are shown 
in Figure 14.   For completion, data from the exogenous conditions are presented in 
Figure 15. 
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Figure 14 Response frequencies recorded at different time intervals after TMS during the 
Endogenous Go/NoGo  condition. Normalized frequencies of button presses after rTMS over 
dFMC (red bar), rIFG (green bar), and V1 (blue bar). Positive numbers represents an increase in 
the number of given button presses, relative to baseline (0 on Y-axis), whereas negative 
numbers indicate a reduction in the number of button presses. Error bars represent the standard 
error. Significant effects (p<0.05) are indicated by an asterisk. Data for the 80-min time points 
are from the last 10 subjects. 
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Figure 15 Response frequencies recorded at different time intervals after rTMS during the 
Exogenous Go (left) and NoGo  (right) conditions. Normalized frequencies of button presses 
after rTMS over dFMC (red bar), rIFG (green bar), and V1 (blue bar). Error bars represent the 
standard error. Significant effects (p<0.05) are indicated by an asterisk.  
 
As shown in Figure 14, the effect of the stimulation on the left dFMC led to an increase 
in the percentage of given button presses in the Endogenous-Go/NoGo condition, effect 
that was still present 50 minutes after the end of the stimulation. To better assess the 
duration and decay of the effect over time, in the last 10 subjects we also recorded 
another block of the Act or Inhibit task 80 minutes from the end of TMS. We performed 
the statistical analysis on these last 10 subjects including this last block. The 
comparison among response frequencies to the Endogenous Go/NoGo condition across 
the blocks yielded significant differences (p=0.011, df=9). The Wilcoxon pairwise 
comparisons between baseline and the fifth block for the three stimulated site showed 
significant differences only for the dFMC stimulation (Z=-2.499, p=0.012), whereas no 
effect was found for the rIFG (Z=-0.358, p=0.721) nor for V1 (Z=1.428, p=0.153) 
stimulation. Thus the effect of TMS over the dFMC was still present 80 minutes from 
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the end of the stimulation, while we found no effect for rIFG nor for V1 stimulation. In 
the Exogenous Go and NoGo conditions we did not find any significant differences. 
 
Response Times 
To test whether the Endogenous condition was generally more difficult than the 
Exogenous condition, we compared mean Response Times (RTs) at baseline between 
the two conditions. A paired t-test showed no significant differences (t(18)=-0.674, 
p=0.509). Additionally, an analysis on RTs was conducted to test whether the effect we 
found on the Endogenous-Go/NoGo condition was due to a general increase in 
“readiness” and impulsivity. For this analysis, we divided pre and post-TMS blocks, 
averaging together the RTs of the four post-stimulation blocks, separately for each 
stimulation site. A repeated measure ANOVA was employed to test the effect of the 
TMS on the speed of response. Results showed no significant differences (p=0.410). An 
analysis on the effect of the different SOAs on the RTs for the Exogenous Go condition 
is reported in the appendix. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
This study investigated the physiological basis of action inhibition using low frequency 
rTMS to directly interfere with cortical areas we hypothesized to be involved in action 
inhibition. To this aim, we compared, within the same participants, externally-triggered 
(exogenous) and internally-driven (endogenous) Go/NoGo conditions, the latter being a 
task that required participants to choose whether to perform an action or not. To our 
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knowledge, this is the first study to address, with a psychophysical paradigm, the causal 
role of the dFMC while subjects freely choose whether to act or not.  
As previously anticipated in the introduction, when investigating the endogenous 
inhibition of actions, there are three factors that should be carefully considered and that 
were not addressed in previous studies: participants should not be able decide before the 
beginning of the trial whether they will perform the action or not; the decision should 
not be influenced by the stimulus or the feedback expectation; finally, subjects should 
have a reason to choose whether to act or not. A first attempt to provide participants 
with a reason to either execute the action or withhold it was made by Kuhn and 
colleagues (2009) using an aversive condition (a glass breaking sound) whenever 
subjects decided not to inhibit an action (to stop the marble rolling down a tilted plane). 
However, this factor did not guarantee that participants decided whether to execute the 
action before the trial initiated, an essential condition for a purely internally-driven 
condition. Other fMRI studies have attempted to design experimental paradigms to 
compare, in the same group, brain activations related to internally and stimulus-driven 
inhibitions (Schel et al., 2014; Hughes et al, 2011). In particular, the voluntary condition 
involved, in one case, (Hughes et al., 2011) a free choice between left and right key 
presses, interrupted on some trials by a stimulus instructing participants which hand to 
use, and in the other case (Schel et al., 2014), a modified version of the task employed 
by Kuhn and colleagues, which they compared to a stop signal paradigm. In our study, 
the endogenous condition was represented by the ambiguous colour resulting from the 
staircase procedure embedded in the Colour Threshold task. Aside from this colour, 
participants were presented with 14 other shades of coloured marbles, 7 green and 7 
magenta. Some of these shades were very similar to the ambiguous colour; this way, 
participants were less likely to learn the correct stimulus-choice pairing, performing a 
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fresh decision on each trial. The presentation of the colours was randomized, so that 
subjects could not predict whether they were going to execute the planned action or not, 
therefore deciding at the time of cue onset (static colored marble). Finally, by 
manipulating the reward in the endogenous condition (50% chance to be rewarded), we 
prevented participants from being influenced, in their decision, by the feedback 
expectation. 
Another issue that has to be considered in a Go/NoGo task is whether the subjects 
planned the motor response in advance or not. This is a crucial point, since the type of 
action inhibition under investigation would change depending on the time at which the 
action plan is interrupted (as described in the introduction). In the Act or Inhibit task, 
subjects were paid a different amount depending on their performance to the task: they 
received a reward after an on time response to a Go trial, or a no-response to NoGo 
trials, while they had 50% chance to receive money on the Endogenous Go/NoGo 
condition. Our preliminary psychophysical task (Speed Threshold task) warranted that 
participants could only press the button on time, if they were ready to respond during 
the Act or Inhibit task. This manipulation likely forced them to always plan the motor 
act and to inhibit it, if necessary. This hypothesis is also supported by the TFRs of Go 
and NoGo conditions previously shown in the result section. In fact, we only found 
significant differences between these conditions in the beta bands in the temporal 
window between 0.8 and 1 s after cue presentation. Alpha and beta negativity (ERD) 
has been associated with motor preparation (Deiber et al., 2012; Lew, Chavarriaga, 
Silvoni, & Millán, 2012), and as it can be seen from the TFR of the NoGo  condition 
(right panel of Figure 11), alpha and beta ERD is present from 250 ms after cue 
presentation. In fact, in the first 800 ms from cue onset the power of alpha and beta 
frequency bands did not differ between Go and NoGo trials. The presence of an alpha-
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beta power reduction early after presentation of the cue, which drove the decision to act 
or inhibit (endogenously or exogenously), suggests that participants always prepared a 
motor response every time a marble was presented, and later inhibited it on NoGo  trials 
(reduction in ERD on NoGo  trials, as shown in Figure 11). 
Since the task we employed has never been used before, we wanted to characterize the 
brain response to the different conditions and, to this aim, we compared the evoked 
electrical activity across trial types. Differences in the cue-locked activity elicited by the 
different task conditions at baseline confirmed our expectations. The electrical activity 
over fronto-central electrodes showed no difference between the two Go conditions, but 
significantly higher amplitudes of event-related potentials elicited in the Exogenous-
NoGo  (externally-triggered) relative to the Endogenous-NoGo  (internally-driven) 
condition, starting from 350 ms after stimulus onset, extending for an interval of 200 
ms. The temporal window during which we found the difference is compatible with 
decision-making processes or motor inhibition mechanisms, which might differentially 
modulate the activity of fronto-central areas depending on the cortical locus of the 
decision to inhibit. The ERPs results contribute to demonstrate that the Exogenous/Go-
NoGo trials were significantly different than the Endogenous/Go-NoGo condition. Thus 
our findings are in agreement with the ‘common path theory’ (Astor-Jack and Haggard, 
2005) that predicts neurophysiological differences between endogenous and exogenous 
NoGo trials, without any differences between the two Go conditions. The differences 
we found at baseline between the ERPs elicited in the different task conditions was also 
replicated in post-TMS data, irrespectively of stimulation site. In the time-frequency 
analysis, we initially found a reduced negativity of the alpha band in the Endogenous 
Go condition, relative to the Exogenous Go condition (Figure 10), but this effect was 
not supported by the single subject analysis. The common path theory is also supported 
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by the lack of difference in the amplitude of response-locked evoked potentials between 
the two Go conditions (data not shown).  
By employing low frequency rTMS, we expected to temporarily impair the activity of 
the stimulated brain areas. Therefore, since the dFMC has been suggested (Kuhn et al., 
2009) to be the ‘veto area’, that is the area responsible for the implementation of the 
internally-driven decision to inhibit an action, we expected to elicit a disinhibition of 
responses, with respect to baseline, on Endogenous Go/NoGo trials only. Results 
showed a significant increase in the response frequency after dFMC stimulation, 
immediately after the end of the stimulation and up to 80 minutes, indicating a long 
lasting sustained effect. This result suggests that the left dFMC is involved in the 
implementation of the decision to inhibit, when the decision is not influenced by 
external sources. Despite some variability across participants, no significant differences 
were found in the Exogenous Go and NoGo trials (Figure 15). One might argue that the 
increase in button presses to the ambiguous stimulus after TMS over dFMC might be 
due to a potential effect on colour perception, for instance participants might have 
pressed the button more often after TMS because they perceived the ambiguous colour 
as “more green”, and this might have been an external factor to influence their decision. 
However, the lack of an effect of the dFMC stimulation on Exogenous Go and NoGo 
trials rules out this hypothesis. In fact, if subjects perceived colours differently after 
TMS, we should have also expected an increase in the response frequencies to 
Exogenous trials, but this was not the case. Finally, it could be argued that TMS might 
have caused a general increase in impulsivity (Bari & Robbins, 2013; Lansbergen, 
Schutter, & Kenemans, 2007) or motor readiness (Deecke, 1996) hence the subjects 
pressed the button more often. However, this is unlikely for two reasons: the 
behavioural effect was selective for the internally-driven condition only, and we found 
  
56 
 
no effect of TMS on RTs for the Endogenous Go trials and on the rMT (as stated at the 
beginning of the ‘TMS-EEG sessions’ section). Together, these data suggest that TMS 
did not simply increase the level of cortico-motor excitability nor it made participants 
more impulsive. Finally, one could also argue that the Endogenous condition was more 
difficult because the stimulus was harder to categorize and, that the dFMC might have 
been involved in conflict detection or resolution. However, the absence of significant 
differences in the RTs between the Exogenous Go trials and the Endogenous Go trials 
does not support this interpretation (Grinband et al., 2011). 
The effect of offline TMS over the dFMC peaked at around 45 minutes after the end of 
the stimulation. We did not predict such long-lasting effect, but in order to better 
characterize the peak and, eventually, the decrease of the effect, we asked our last 10 
participants to perform an additional block, recorded approximately 80 minutes from 
the end of the stimulation. At this time point we started to see a decrease in the number 
of responses to the Endogenous condition and, the effect was likely returning to 
baseline (Figure 14). The time course of the effect is particularly interesting and 
relevant, since, while it is well established that TMS can induce excitatory or inhibitory 
effects, depending on the frequency and intensity of the stimulation, it is still unclear 
how long the effect can last and if it changes depending on the area that has been 
stimulated (Berger et al., 2011). Experimental evidence from studies of the primary and 
secondary motor areas as well as of the parietal cortex, using 1Hz repetitive TMS have 
shown that the duration of the effect is approximately the same or less than the 
stimulation length (Robertson et al., 2003). However, it is worth noting that not many 
studies investigated potentially long-lasting effects of low frequency stimulation, what 
could be a marker of LTD and LTP effects (Nyffeler et al., 2006). Recently, there have 
been examples showing low frequency rTMS effects that last at least 30 minutes in 
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stroke patients (Agosta et al., 2014) and, some interesting effects in healthy subjects that 
increase exponentially as the number of minutes of stimulation are doubled (20 minutes 
instead of 10; for a review see Thut and Pascual Leone, 2010) or when theta burst 
stimulation is used (Nyffeler et al., 2006). Some recent studies have indeed found that 
TMS over the prefrontal cortex in one hemisphere caused an increase in BOLD 
response in the opposite un-stimulated hemisphere. The effect was likely compensatory 
as it was evident in the behavioral performance after stimulation (Lee and D’Esposito, 
2012). Other TMS studies of the motor cortex have found similar compensatory effects 
(Strens et al., 2003). We can therefore speculate that the temporary de-activation of the 
dFMC might have caused changes in other areas part of the action inhibition circuit, 
such as the left IFG and the preSMA (Obeso et al., 2013) through neuroplasticity 
processes evolving across time. 
The role of the rIFG has been related to exogenous action inhibition (Ditye et al., 2012) 
and we could expect an effect of the TMS on Exogenous NoGo  trials, however we did 
not find any. In our experiment, TMS over rIFG only had a significant effect in the 
Endogenous Go/NoGo condition around 50 minutes from the end of the stimulation, 
and not before, a peak that immediately decreased, as tested 80 minutes post-TMS. The 
lack of an effect immediately after the end of the stimulation speaks against a role of the 
rIFG in endogenous action inhibition and one can speculate that this later effect could 
be attributed to rebound activations in other parts of the action inhibition circuit. It has 
been demonstrated, in fact, that TMS stimulation of the left IFG can generate an up-
regulation of the homologous contralateral area measured through fMRI 45 to 60 
minutes after the end of the TMS stimulation (Hartwigsen et al., 2013). While at the 
moment we don’t have a clear explanation for this after effect with a delay, we could 
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hypothesize that different types of neurons might react differently to stimulation and 
show a delayed plasticity (Stefan et al., 2000).  
The absence of effect of the rIFG stimulation on the Exogenous trials was rather 
surprising, but the role of the rIFG in action inhibition is greatly debated (Swick et al., 
2011) and it is not clear whether the portion of the inferior frontal cortex that we 
stimulated (for a detailed functional topography see Cai & Leung, 2011) is indeed 
responsible for action inhibition. Another possible explanation relies in the nature of the 
task, which required participants to inhibit the response, either endogenously or 
exogenously, on around 50% of the trials (25% exogenous NoGo trials and roughly half 
of the endogenous trials). The rIFG has been mostly associated with reactive inhibition 
(Zandbelt et al., 2013) and it is possible that the features of our Go/NoGo task were not 
ideal to directly involve rIFG in the inhibition of planned responses.  
Finally, rTMS over the control visual area V1 had no effect at any interval and 
conditions we tested. This null result further support the idea that the effect we found on 
the frequency of responses to the internally-driven condition was not caused by a 
general increase in arousal due to TMS and is not likely cause by a change in visual 
perception.  
 
3.5 Conclusions  
 In this study we investigated the causal role of specific brain areas in internally-driven 
and externally-triggered actions. To this aim, we created a condition (Endogenous 
Go/NoGo) that allowed participants to decide, on each trial, whether to perform or 
inhibit a planned action. We manipulated reward contingencies to give participants a 
motivated reason to either execute or stop the action. rTMS was employed to directly 
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interfere with the activity of two brain areas hypothesized to be involved in action 
inhibition: the left dFMC and the right IFG. The former has been related to internally-
driven action inhibition and the latter to the externally-triggered inhibition of actions. 
Therefore, by inhibiting the activity of these areas, we could expect to find a 
disinhibition of responses in the endogenous and exogenous condition, respectively. 
Instead we only found an effect of the dFMC stimulation in the Endogenous Go/NoGo 
condition, without an effect of the rIFG stimulation on Exogenous trials. Furthermore, 
the increase in the number of given button presses, after dFMC stimulation, was very 
long lasting, which is very intriguing because it might indicate that plastic changes 
caused by TMS can have potential interesting application. In particular, the results of 
our study might have implications for the treatment of impulse control in brain disorders 
(Aron et al., 2014). It will be interesting in future studies to investigate more in detail 
these enduring effects to also determine the physiological changes at the cortical level 
on the prefrontal circuits, by pairing TMS with fMRI or MEG.  
Altogether, these results support the hypothesis of separate neuronal circuits for 
internally-driven and externally triggered actions. EEG data showed that the 
endogenous and exogenous conditions are processed differently by fronto-central brain 
areas. We demonstrated that the left dFMC is directly involved in the endogenous 
inhibition of actions, however future studies will be needed in order to clarify what 
other brain areas are part of the internally-driven action inhibition circuit.  
Future studies should also further explore the role of the primary and secondary motor 
areas in action inhibition and, particularly, their responses for externally driven or 
externally triggered action inhibition. 
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4.1 Experiment 2: Investigating the time course of proactive inhibition 
 
The vast majority of studies on action inhibition involve the presentation of a stimulus 
(e.g NoGo stimulus, stop signal) to which participants must quickly react by 
withholding the motor response. Under these conditions, subjects interrupt all motor 
outputs to make sure that the action is cancelled. Inevitably, the selectivity of the action 
inhibition is lost, a side effect of the quick reactive inhibition required by the 
experimental paradigm. However, as pointed out by Aron in 2011, “the number of 
scenarios requiring fast stopping, and especially stopping that has global effects on the 
motor system, is probably limited”. In everyday life, we often need to selectively inhibit 
one action, while continuing to perform others. This selective inhibition can be 
triggered by some specific events, hence named reactive selective inhibition, or it can be 
proactively modulated depending on the contextual information. Proactive control (Cai, 
Oldenkamp, & Aron, 2011; Lo, Boucher, Pare, Schall, & Wang, 2009) is a top-down 
sustained inhibition modulated by internal and external factors, exerted by the brain 
while keeping goal-directed information active in working memory. This gating 
mechanism is supposedly activated when there is uncertainty about the identity of an 
upcoming stimulus (Niemi et al., 1981; Näätänen R., 1970). For this reason, in 
experimental settings, experimental protocols usually provide carefully chosen cues or 
warning signals to manipulate the amount of information provided to participants in 
order to involve proactive inhibition to a different degree. For instance, Smittenaar and 
colleagues (2013) used fMRI to investigate the neuronal circuits of proactive selective 
inhibition, using a modified version of a task developed by Aron and Verbruggen 
(2008). In their task, the authors made a distinction between “informative cue” and 
“uninformative cue” trials. In the “informative” trials, the cue indicated the hand 
subjects needed to inhibit from executing a response, while in “uninformative cue” trials 
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subjects were not aware of which hand to inhibit on stop trials. They found a set of 
brain areas active both during proactive selective inhibition, which are usually found 
also in reactive global inhibition (right IFG, left SMA/pre-SMA). The cues or warning 
signals used in these paradigms modulate response times (RTs), probably by 
influencing either sensory/perceptual processes, action selection and/or motor processes 
(Fecteau and Munoz, 2007). This general state of alertness might, therefore, increase the 
probability to respond to an upcoming stimulus. It has been suggested that such cue-
locked motor activations are automatic  (Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & Benraiss, 
2008). Top-down inhibition is needed to stop them and, this inhibitory activity likely 
originates in the prefrontal cortex in order to prevent the execution of cue-triggered 
unwanted motor responses (Jaffard et al., 2008). In a recent study, Boulinguez and 
colleagues (2009) investigated the time course of this gating mechanism, and they tested 
an uncertainty condition by mixing warned and unwarned trials in the same block. In 
warned trials, a non informative warning cue preceded the target by a variable time 
interval (stimulus onset asynchrony - SOA) and participants were asked not to respond 
to the cue, but to wait for the target to appear. While classical theories of inhibition 
(Näätänen  et al., 1974) would always predict shorter RTs for cued vs. non cued trials, 
the authors found a paradoxical lengthening of RTs for cued, compared to noncued 
trials, when the SOA was shorter than 300 ms.  
This result cannot be explained by classical theories that would always predict shorter 
RTs for cued trials (e.g., Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 1982; Warner et al., 1990). In our 
experiment, we wanted, therefore, to test the hypothesis whether a proactive inhibition 
mechanism is automatically triggered when there is uncertainty about the target identity. 
We used single pulse TMS to record motor evoked potentials (MEPs) while participants 
performed warned and unwarned trials. Our aim was to compare different task 
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conditions (pure vs. mixed block, warned vs. unwarned trials) to determine whether 
they would differently elicit proactive inhibition. The warning cue should automatically 
trigger motor responses that, in turn, should be inhibited by proactive inhibition; 
however, this process is not active in pure unwarned trials. In the mixed block, the 
uncertainty regarding the identity of the upcoming stimulus on each trial (either warning 
signal or target on warned and unwarned trials, respectively) would activate proactive 
inhibition. We measured both RTs and MEPs to test whether the proactive inhibition 
mechanism modulates the levels of corticospinal excitability. We tested two SOAs (150 
and 300 ms), a time interval from the beginning of each trial and the target to test how 
long it takes, to the proactive inhibition mechanism, to deactivate (Boulinguez et al., 
2009). We expected longer RTs and smaller MEP amplitudes for the short, compared to 
the long SOA, in warned trials and in the mixed condition. Additionally, we expected 
differences between pure unwarned and mixed unwarned trials, suggesting a 
deployment of the proactive inhibition mechanism in the latter case.  
 
4.2 Materials and methods 
Participants 
Twenty-seven right-handed university students (mean age 22.5 years; SD 3.8; 14 
females) with no neurological or psychiatric impairments voluntarily participated in the 
study. Handedness was determined via a condensed version of the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All subjects provided written informed consent, 
according to the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was 
approved by the ethical committee of the University of Trento. All participants passed 
the TMS safety screenings.  
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Task and Experimental procedure 
Participants were asked to seat on a comfortable chair with their right arm relaxed on a 
pillow to test their resting motor threshold (rMT). Participants’ motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) were recorded from the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and the abductor digiti 
minimi (ADM) of the right hand, using Ag/AgCl surface electrodes. TMS pulses were 
delivered to the controlateral primary motor area (M1) using a 70 mm Figure-8-coil 
connected to a Magstim Rapid2 (Magstim Co., UK) and MEPs were registered and 
measured using the software LabChart 7 (ADinstruments), applying a bandpass filter 
between 20 and 2500 Hz. The hand area was found by eliciting visible twitches on the 
contralateral hand muscles and the hot spot for FDI was assessed by measuring the 
rMT, indexed as the lowest intensity of stimulation necessary to elicit 5 MEPs of at 
least 50 µV out of 10 consecutive pulses. TMS stimulation intensity was then set to 
110% of the rMT (mean stimulation output: 64% of the maximal intensity of the 
stimulator). Participants wore an elastic cap on which the position of the coil was drawn 
to make sure it was in same position throughout the experiment. Participants performed 
a Speed Threshold task (see below for a detailed description), during which no TMS 
was applied. Subsequently, they performed three blocks of warned and unwarned trials 
(see below for a detailed description), two of which contained the same type of trials 
(pure block design) and one had the two types of trials randomly mixed (mixed block 
design). The order of presentation of the three blocks was pseudorandomized across 
participants. During these blocks, single pulse TMS was employed to trigger M1 and 
record MEPs. Throughout the duration of each session, subjects seated on a comfortable 
chair at a distance of 57 cm from the computer screen, with their chin on a chinrest. The 
task was presented on a 22” Samsung 2233RZ LCD monitor running at 120Hz on a 
Windows 7 machine running Matlab 7.2 and Psychotoolbox 2.0 experimentation 
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presentation software. On each trial, participants were asked to abduct the right index 
finger to press the space bar of the keyboard placed vertically next to their arm (on the 
left side), with the keys facing the right hand. Participants were asked to keep the 
muscles relaxed until response, and to relax it again immediately after they responded. 
Trials in which noise (amplitude > 50 µV) was present in the temporal window from -
100 ms to 0 (TMS pulse) were discarded from the analysis. The whole duration of the 
experiment was approximately 2 hours. 
During the Speed Threshold task, on each trial, participants were presented with a white 
fixation cross at the top of a tilted plane, for 100 ms. The plane consisted of a white line, 
0.35 thick and 27.8 long degrees of visual angle, with a luminance of  204.5 cd/m2, 
tilted at an angle of 30 degrees, running from the upper left to the bottom right quadrant 
of the screen. After 100 ms, a white static marble (3.55° in diameter) appeared and 
started rolling down the tilted plane at a fixed velocity randomly either 50 or 200 ms 
from presentation. The marble was always presented at the top of the plane, at fixation, 
hence on the top-left side of the monitor. All stimuli were presented on a black 
background (0.2 cd/m2). Participants were asked to wait for the ball to start moving and 
then abduct their right index finger to press the space bar as quickly as possible to stop 
the marble. A 3-up-1-down staircase procedure was employed to determine, for each 
participant, the threshold speed at which they were able to correctly stop the marble 
before falling off the plane on 80% of the trials. Subjects performed 5 training trials to 
become familiar with the task and adjust the keyboard at a comfortable distance from 
their hand, and a maximum of 100 valid trials. The task ended when the threshold speed 
was determined.   
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In the subsequent tasks, participants performed two types of trials, Warned and 
Unwarned trials, either in a pure block or mixed block design. The structure of the two 
trial types is shown in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16 Trial structure (n the actual task, the background is black and the plane and marble are 
white). Top and bottom arrows represent unwarned and warned trials time intervals, 
respectively. On warned trials, the fixation cross is replaced, after 50 ms, by the cue (second 
image from the left), whereas on unwarned trials the fixation cross is displayed for 100 ms. 
Black thunder signs represent TMS pulses that could be delivered either at the presentation of 
the fixation cross (baseline) or at target presentation. 
 
Each trial started with a white fixation cross on the top of the tilted plane (same as the 
Speed Threshold task) for either 50 ms on warned trials or 100 ms on unwarned trials. 
On warned trials, a white marble (same as the Speed Threshold task) was superimposed 
on the fixation cross for another 50 ms, representing the warn signal. After a randomly 
selected time interval of either 50 or 200 ms during which a black screen was presented, 
the marble appeared and immediately started rolling down the tilted plane at the 
threshold speed determined in the previous task. Participants were asked to keep the 
hand muscles relaxed, and then abduct the index finger as quickly as possible to press 
the spacebar and stop the marble. The ball started (target) after a randomly chose SOA 
of either 150 or 300 ms. After the target disappeared, a black background was displayed 
for 1000 ms during which late responses were recorded. The duration of each trial was 
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the same for warned and unwarned trials, and time between the appearance of the 
fixation cross and target presentation was always 150 or 300 ms, depending on the 
SOA. After the response, a feedback was shown for 1500 ms along with the text “Too 
early” if they responded before the target appearance, “Stopped” if they blocked the 
marble before falling off the plane or “Too late”, if they pressed the spacebar after the 
marble fell off the plane. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was randomly chosen between 
1150 and 1500 ms during which a black background was presented. The total duration 
of each trial was variable (between 4400 and 5000 ms), depending on the SOA, the 
speed of the ball, the response times (RTs) and the ITI. On pure blocks, participants 
performed 8 training trials and 256 valid trials with a small break every 64 trials, in 
which subjects rested their eyes while keeping the head on the chinrest. On the mixed 
block, participants performed 16 training trials and 512 valid trials, with short breaks 
every 64 trials and a longer break halfway through the block During these trials, a TMS 
pulse was delivered to M1 once every two trials, in order to have enough time between 
two consecutive pulses (at least 8 seconds) and avoid additive effects of the pulses, and 
to have enough trials without TMS for RTs analysis. On trials in which the TMS pulse 
was delivered, the timing of the stimulation was randomly chosen between two possible 
time points: at the presentation of the fixation cross (baseline) or at target presentation.  
 
Data analysis 
The data in the mixed block were divided into warned and unwarned trials and analyzed 
separately. Therefore we compared, for each subject, RTs and MEPs across 4 task 
conditions: pure-warned (PW), pure-unwarned (PU), mixed-warned (MW) and mixed-
unwarned (MU). Within each condition, trials were divided according to the SOA and, 
for the MEP analysis, according to TMS pulse time (baseline vs. target presentation). 
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Within the 256 trials per task condition (in the mixed block the 512 trials were divided 
between warned and unwarned trials), in half of the trials TMS was used with two 
possible SOA conditions. In total, there were 32 trials per SOA*TMS pulse condition 
and, for RTs, 64 trials per SOA within each task condition. For the RTs analysis, trials 
with TMS and with RTs shorter than 100 ms or in which a response was given during 
the SOA period were excluded. A 3-way ANOVA was conducted with factors SOA 
(150 or 300 ms), Block (pure vs. Mixed) and Cue (Warned vs. Unwarned), using 
Bonferroni post hoc correction. For the MEP analysis, the peak-to-peak amplitude was 
measured for each trial, and the number of clean trials per condition*SOA*TMS time 
was calculated for each subject. Due to the presence of noise in the pre-pulse recorded 
EMG in an excessive number of trials (leaving less than 5 clean trials per 
condition*SOA*TMS time), nine subjects had to be excluded and the subsequent 
analysis on MEPs was carried out on the remaining 18 subjects. Because of large 
intersubject variability, individual MEPs were Z-scored, including all MEPs during all 
the task conditions (see Davranche et al., 2007). MEPs amplitude from the FDI and 
ADM muscles were Z-scored and average amplitudes were then calculated for each 
subject, for each task condition. A 4-way ANOVA was conducted with factors  (150 or 
300 ms), Block (Pure vs. Mixed), Cue (Warned vs. Unwarned) and TMS time(baseline, 
target), with Bonferroni post-hoc correction. For all analyses the level of significance α 
was 0.05. 
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4.3 Results 
Response Times 
The 3-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of factors Cue (F(1,26)= 151.542, 
p=0.000) and SOA (F(1,26)=122.004, p=0.000), whereas no effect of the Block was 
found (F(1,26)=1.162, p=0.291). Significant results were found for the Cue by Block 
interaction (F(1,26)=13.707, p=0.001) and Cue by SOA interaction (F(1,26)=16.044, 
p=0.000), while the Block by SOA interaction was not significant (F(1,26)=3.066, 
p=0.092). The 3-way interaction Cue by Block by SOA was not significant 
(F(1,26)=0.000, p=0.995). To investigate the 2 way interaction Cue by Block, within 
each of the four task conditions, trials with different SOAs were collapsed and average 
RTs were recomputed. Two paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare 
unwarned trials between the pure and the mixed block and the same analysis was 
conducted for warned trials. A significant effect of the factor Block was only present on 
unwarned trials (t(26)= -3.385, p=0.002), which made RTs significantly longer for the 
mixed block than for the pure block, whereas no effect was found for warned trials 
(t(26)= 1.049, p=0.304). Results are shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17 Mean RTs are shown for warned and unwarned trials separately. Error bars represent 
the standard error. A significant effect of the Block factor is present only for unwarned trials, 
with Pure Unwarned trials significantly slower than Mixed Unwarned trials. There was no 
difference across blocks for warned trials. 
 
To explore the Cue by SOA interaction, we performed 4 separate paired samples t-tests 
comparing, for each Cue condition, mean RTs between short and long SOAs. 
Significant results were found for all the four conditions: warned pure trials (t(26)= -
7.989, p=0.000), unwarned pure trials (t(26)= -6.625, p=0.000), warned mixed trials 
(t(26)= -9.116, p=0.000) and unwarned mixed trials (t(26)= -6.009, p=0.000). Mean 
RTs are always faster when the SOA is 300 ms than 150 ms. Results are displayed in 
Figure 18. 
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Figure 18 The figure shows mean Response Times for the four task conditions across the two 
SOAs. Mean RTs are faster in all conditions when the SOA is 300 ms. Error bars represent the 
standard error. 
 
MEPs  
The 4-way ANOVA for the control muscle ADM did not yield significant results for 
any of the four factors, whereas the same analysis on the mean MEP amplitudes 
recorded from FDI produced significant results for factors Cue (F(1,17)=10.934, 
p=0.004), TMS time (F(1,17)=34.874, p=0.000), SOA (F(1,17)=8.126, p=0.011), but 
not for factor Block (F(1,17)=1.871, p=0.189). Significant 2-way interactions were also 
found for Block by Cue (F(1,17)=7.885, p=0.012), Cue by TMS time (F(1,17)=16.100, 
p=0.001), Cue by SOA (F(1,17)=23.030, p=0.000) and a trend for TMS by SOA 
(F(1,17)=4.423, p=0.051). The 3-way interaction Cue*TMS time*SOA was also 
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significant (F(1,17)=7.824, p=0.012) and the Block*Cue*TMS (F(1,17)=3.467, 
p=0.080) showed a trend towards significance. The 4-way interaction was not 
significant. To determine the impact of TMS time on the amplitude of recorded MEPs 
we performed eight paired samples t-tests to compare, for each of the four task 
conditions, divided in two groups according to the SOA, those in which the TMS pulse 
was delivered at baseline vs. target appearance. Mean MEPs amplitudes are 
significantly higher at TMS time 2 (target) for conditions: Pure Warned SOA 300 
(t(17)= -4.443, p=0.000), Mixed Warned SOA 300 (t(17)= -5.228, p=0.000) and Mixed 
Warned SOA 150 (t(17)= -2.849, p=0.011). All other conditions did not produce 
significant results.  
To investigate the Cue by SOA and Block by Cue interactions, data recorded at baseline 
were separated from those recorded at target appearance. Two repeated measure 
ANOVAs were conducted (see Figure 19), one for each TMS time, to compare the eight 
conditions (four task conditions by 2 SOAs). Giving the high number of comparisons, 
Fisher’s LSD post hoc test was used instead of Bonferroni correction, which would be 
too conservative in this case. When the TMS pulse was delivered at baseline (when the 
fixation cross was presented), the amplitude of the recorded MEPs did not differ across 
conditions (F(7,119)=0.779, p=0.503), whereas for MEPs recorded at target appearance, 
significant differences were found (F(7,119)=8.310, p=0.000). As shown in Figure 19 
(right panel), MEPs amplitude was modulated by factor Block and SOA, only during 
warned trials. In particular, MEPs were significantly larger when the SOA was 300 ms 
with respect to 150 ms for both pure warned (p=0.002) and mixed warned (p=0.003) 
trials and the difference between pure warned and mixed warned trials was significant 
for both trials with SOA 300 ms (p=0.048) and 150 ms (p=0.024). 
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Figure 19 The Figure shows mean amplitude of MEPs recorded from the FDI muscle across the 
four task conditions (pure warned, pure unwarned, mixed warned, mixed unwarned), dividing 
trials according to the SOA. MEPs recorded at baseline (when the TMS pulse was delivered at 
the beginning of the trial) are shown on the left side, whereas MEPs recorded at target 
presentation are displayed on the right side. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
4.4 Discussion  
In this experiment we explored the impact of warning cues on the speed of response to 
the presentation of a target. By comparing warned and unwarned trials, we were able to 
test the impact of the proactive inhibition mechanism on both RTs and MEPs. We found 
a significant increase in MEP amplitude for the FDI muscle at TMS time 2 (target 
presentation) for the mixed warned (both SOA conditions) and the pure warned (for 
SOA 300 ms) conditions (see figure 19). While the fixation cross (unwarned trials) had 
no effect on the amplitude of the MEPs recorded at target presentation, relative to 
baseline, cue presentation did have an effect. In fact, except from the pure warned 
condition with SOA=150 ms, the presentation of the cue always exerted an increase in 
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corticospinal excitability (higher MEPs at TMS time 2), as recorded from the FDI 
muscle.  
According to Boulinguez and colleagues (2008, 2009), the presentation of a warning 
cue (static marble) should automatically activate a motor response which is then 
inhibited through top-down mechanisms that prevent the execution of anticipated 
responses (Jaffard et al., 2008). The contrast between MEPs recorded at target 
presentation vs. baseline allows us to test whether the presentation of the cue 
automatically triggers the motor response. One might say that the reason why in the 
pure warned condition (with SOA=150 ms) MEPs at TMS time 2 were not different 
than baseline is because 100 ms is not enough time to plan the response. However, in 
the warned mixed condition, with the same SOA, MEPs were significantly higher than 
those recorded at cue presentation. Given these results, we cannot conclude that the 
presentation of a cue automatically triggers motor response. 
Irrespectively of whether the motor response is automatically triggered or not, 
participants still needed to prevent undesired anticipated responses that were 
preactivated by the cue. Proactive inhibition should be active on warned trials 
(irrespectively of Block condition) and for the unwarned trials of the mixed block. In 
this last condition, participants could not predict whether, after the presentation of the 
fixation cross, the cue or the target would appear. Proactive inhibition was therefore 
necessary to prevent unwanted responses to the cue. In their study, Bouliguez and 
colleagues (2009) found three main effects on the RTs to a similar task: a ‘baseline shift 
effect’ observed when comparing unwarned trials between the pure and mixed block 
conditions, where the latter induced longer RTs; the so called ‘standard warning 
benefit’, that is longer RTs for warned relative to unwarned trials within the mixed 
block (for SOA of at least 300 ms) and finally, the ‘paradoxical warning cost’, namely 
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longer RTs in the pure warned, relative to unwarned trials with a short SOA (100 ms). 
In our experiment, we replicated their baseline shift effect (Figure 17), finding longer 
RTs for unwarned trials in the mixed relative to pure block. This effect would support 
the idea that a proactive inhibition mechanism is activated when there is uncertainty 
about task demands (Chen, Muggleton, Tzeng, Hung, & Juan, 2009; Sharp et al., 2010). 
We did not find the same difference in the MEPs (Figure 19), and a possible 
explanation is that in the unwarned condition the motor response was not pre-activated, 
therefore the effect of inhibition could not be measured. Within the mixed block, a 
comparison of the RTs between warned and unwarned trials (Figure 17) revealed 
significant differences, with longer RTs for unwarned trials. This ‘standard warning 
benefit’ effect would support Boulinguez et al.’s hypothesis that the proactive inhibition 
mechanism, deactivated by cue presentation, would reduce the induced slowing of 
responses, thus allowing participants to react faster to target presentation. Finally, we 
could expect longer RTs for warned compared to unwarned pure trials, when the SOA 
was 150 ms (paradoxical warning cost). However, as Figure 18 shows, in our data 
warning trials always elicited shorter RTs, relative to unwarned trials, irrespectively of 
SOA and block condition. The paradoxical warning cost, according to Boulinguez et al. 
(2009), is caused by the deactivation of the proactive inhibition mechanism after cue 
presentation and this process should take about 300 ms. We did find a difference in RTs 
between the two SOA conditions, with “paradoxically” longer RTs in the short SOA 
trials, however this effect was also present for unwarned trials, condition that should not 
require (at least in the pure block condition) proactive inhibition. Moreover, we found 
significant differences in the MEPs as recorded at target presentation (Figure 19, right 
panel) for warned trials between the two SOA conditions. MEP amplitudes were, in 
fact, bigger for the long SOA trials relative to the short SOA trials, for both pure and 
mixed block conditions. The bigger MEPs recorded in the long SOA conditions are 
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consistent with the proactive inhibition hypothesis: if this mechanism is deactivated by 
the warning signal, it might take some time to fully deactivate. We could, therefore, 
expect bigger MEPs for long relative to short SOA trials as a sign of the disinhibition of 
responses. If such mechanism was fully active at short SOAs, then one would also 
expect to find MEPs smaller than baseline, but this is not what we found. For trials with 
short SOAs, MEPs in the pure warned trials are not different than baseline (Figure 19, 
left panel), whereas for warned mixed trials they are bigger than baseline.  
Together, these results support the hypothesis of proactive inhibition mechanisms 
activated by specific task demands, such as uncertainty for the upcoming stimulus, 
which induced strategic slowing of responses. Moreover, when participants are given 
more time to prepare the motor response, RTs are shorter and the level of corticospinal 
excitability is increased (MEP amplitude), in accordance with classical theories (e.g., 
Näätänen 1970; Näätänen  et al., 1974; Niemi and Näätänen, 1981). Our data, however, 
do not support the notion that the warning signal automatically deactivates this 
proactive inhibition mechanism in around 300 ms. We should point out that, in our 
paradigm, the warning signal was the static marble on top of the tilted plane, while 
Boulinguez and co-workers used a neutral cue (and not the stationary target, as we did).  
The level of information carried by the cue is known to differentially influence attention 
to the task (Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Prinzmetal, Zvinyatskovskiy, Gutierrez, 
& Dilem, 2009) and this could have modulated RTs differently. However, if inhibition 
of motor responses was activated to prevent the execution of anticipated responses, we 
should have found reduced MEPs, at least for the short SOA condition.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
Under conditions of uncertainty, inhibition helps us prevent the execution of unwanted 
responses. This form of proactive control has been investigated by paradigms in which a 
warning signal (cue), to which participants are instructed not to respond, precedes the 
presentation of a target. By manipulating the cue-target delay (SOA), researchers have 
investigated the time course of the (de)activation of the proactive inhibition 
mechanisms. In this study we used single pulse TMS to trigger MEPs in two muscles, 
one involved in the motor response (FDI) and one control muscle (ADM). We found 
significant MEP activations induced by the warning signals for the FDI muscle only, 
indicating that we selectively activated the response-relevant effector. RTs were also 
modulated by task conditions: they were shorter in trials where a cue preceded the 
target. Finally, MEPs and RTs on cued trials were differently modulated depending on 
the SOA. This effect might indicate the build-up of a motor preparation rather than a 
deactivation of a proactive inhibition mechanism, as suggested by previous studies 
(Boulinguez, Ballanger, Granjon, & Benraiss, 2009; Jaffard, Benraiss, Longcamp, 
Velay, & Boulinguez, 2007). Future studies should further manipulate task demands 
(probability of presentation of the target, maximum time to respond) to investigate how 
these influence the deployment of proactive inhibition. 
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Final Remarks 
Action inhibition has often been treated as a unitary construct, but everyday experiences 
and scientific results suggest that we employ different types of inhibition, depending on 
the context. External factors and internal urges are integrated by the brain to perform 
decisions, regarding which action to execute among possible alternatives, when to 
execute it and, ultimately, whether to perform the planned action or inhibit it.  
The first set of experiments was devised to study the difference between externally-
triggered and internally-driven action inhibition and we tested the direct role of two 
brain areas, the left dFMC and the right IFG. We used repetitive TMS to temporarily 
inhibit the activity of these areas, and test the effect of stimulation on the EEG activity 
and the performance of participants on a modified version of a Go/NoGo paradigm. In 
this task, we compared an Exogenous condition (externally-triggered), in which the 
stimulus informed participants to either perform or inhibit the planned action, to an 
Endogenous Go/NoGo condition (internally-driven), which required participants to 
freely decide whether to perform the button press or not. The activity of fronto-central 
electrodes showed significant differences in the amplitude of ERPs between the two 
NoGo conditions, suggesting that the activity of these areas is differentially modulated 
during action inhibition, depending on the locus of the decision (internal vs. external). 
Behavioural results confirmed our expectations: after inhibiting the dFMC, participants 
were less likely to respond, in the Endogenous Go/NoGo condition only. This result 
indicates that the dFMC is directly involved in the internally-driven inhibition of actions 
and that at least partially separated brain circuits are responsible for externally-triggered 
and internally-driven action inhibition. 
  
78 
 
Another condition that activates inhibitory control is when there is uncertainty regarding 
the appearance of a stimulus we need to respond to. For instance, while sitting in a 
waiting room, we wait for our name to be called before we get up. In this scenario, we 
might pre-activate the action while refraining from standing up too early. In this 
condition, a proactive inhibition mechanism is tonically active to avoid unwanted, 
anticipated responses. Proactive inhibition was investigated in the second set of 
experiments, where we compared different task conditions designed to activate 
proactive inhibition, whilst using single pulse TMS to elicit MEPs, a measure of 
cortico-motor excitability. Results indicated that the presentation of a warning signal 
had a beneficial effect on RTs, speeding up responses to the target, irrespectively of the 
time interval separating the two. MEPs recorded from the muscle involved in the motor 
response (FDI) showed increased amplitudes in almost all conditions in which the 
warning signal preceded the target, suggesting that this standard warning benefit 
involves motor preparation. Finally, the expected results on RTs of warned trials were 
also found for unwarned pure trials, a result that is not compatible with the previously 
proposed theory that proactive inhibition should be deactivated by the cue (Boulinguez 
et al., 2008). Moreover MEP amplitudes were not reduced on warned trials, as it would 
have been predicted by the proactive inhibition theory. Therefore, we can conclude that 
proactive inhibition causes a strategic slowing of responses, without directly modulating 
cortico-spinal excitability.  
The way our brain exerts inhibitory control still needs further investigation, since it’s a 
very important aspect of the executive functions that allow us to flexibly control our 
impulses and responses to the environment, to meet our goals. When inhibitory control 
is impaired, the consequence is the inability to resist to externally and internally-
triggered urges, symptoms that are present in many pathological conditions such as 
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ADHD, Parkinson’s Disease and Schizophrenia. Future studies should explore the brain 
circuits involved in inhibitory control, developing ad-hoc paradigms to investigate the 
different types of action inhibition. 
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Appendix 
Experiment 1. 
The effect of SOA on RTs 
I chose to use different SOAs for this experiment based on studies on proactive 
inhibition and the effect of cues on visual attention (Jaffard et al., 2007; Prinzmetal et 
al., 2009). It has been shown how the presentation of a cue (warning signal) impacts 
RTs. Informative, central or peripheral cues are thought to activate voluntary and 
involuntary attentional processes (Prinzmetal et al., 2005) and influence the way we 
react to upcoming stimuli. When involuntary attention is engaged, beneficial effects 
(shorter RTs to spatially congruent targets) of cue presentation are already present at 
short SOAs (e.g., Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 1982; Warner et al., 1990). Recently, studies 
on proactive inhibition (Boulinguez et al., 2009) have found prolonged RTs for short 
(<300 ms) relative to long SOAs. In experiment 1 the static marble was used as a cue, a 
stimulus that warns participants to be ready for the presentation of the target (ball 
motion), a condition similar to the Warned Pure block of experiment 2. We included 6 
different SOAs: 150, 300, 500, 1200, 1500, 3000 ms. The first three SOAs were chosen 
in a temporal window close to 300 ms, while the longer SOAs were included so that 
participants could not easily predict the time of target presentation. Since in the 
Endogenous Go/NoGo condition participants also had to voluntarily decide whether to 
peform the button press or not, this analysis was conducted on Exogenous Go trials 
only. Trials from the pre-TMS Exogenous condition were divided according to SOA 
and a repeated measure ANOVA was conducted on RTs (including late responses), with 
Bonferroni correction. Significant differences were found across the SOAs 
(F(1,18)=18.964,p=0.000) and paired comparison showed significant differences 
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between trials with SOA=150ms and all the others (Figure 20). No other significant 
differences were found.  
 
 
Figure 20 Mean RTs from the Exogenous Go condition, divided by the six SOAs are shown. 
When the SOA was 150 ms, RTs were significantly longer than all other conditions (** 
p<0.001). Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
RTs from the Exogenous Go trials with an SOA of 150 ms were significantly longer 
than all the other SOA conditions. This result is consistent with the results of 
experiment 2, where we found longer RTs for the shortest SOA (150 ms) on warned 
trials. In the Act or Inhibit task, however, on roughly half of the trials  participants did 
not have to press the button. Therefore, in addition to the uncertainty regarding the 
timing of target presentation, participants also had to decide (upon cue presentation) 
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whether to respond or not, a decision which was absent in experiment 2. In addition to 
the fact that the two experiments were conducted on different groups of participants, 
this might explain why the RTs shown in Figure 20 are generally longer than those 
presented in experiment 2 (Figure 18). 
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